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THE WHOLE TRUTH: RESTORING
REALITY TO CHILDREN'S NARRATIVE
IN LONG-TERM INCEST CASES
LESLIE FETNER*
I. INTRODUCTION
M.B., a fifteen-year-old girl, states that one night, after living with
her stepfather for over six years, she engaged in an act of sexual inter-
course with him.' Although she claims to have submitted to him out
of fear, she concedes that he neither forced nor threatened her that
night.2 A short time after making her allegation, she runs away from
home, refusing to speak to police for over two weeks.3
Her stepfather denies her accusation, despite being found passed
out in her bed. He states that he had gotten very drunk in a bar,
come home and stumbled into the wrong room. 4 Indeed, by the time
the case comes to trial, the State stipulates that he had been to the bar
in question, gotten drunk, and even had sex with a woman he met at
the bar.5 Why, he asks, would he then have sex with his stepdaughter?
Although an inquiry might naturally focus on the question of
which story to believe, the criminal justice system asks a much nar-
rower one at trial: Is the complainant's story believable beyond a rea-
sonable doubt? To answer that question, jurors would strictly
scrutinize M.B.'s narrative of events in light of their own ideas of what
is credible. 6 Such scrutiny would likely center on the incongruity of
* Instructor in Law, New York University School of Law. For their comments, I thank
Sally Bums, Peggy Davis, Andrea McArdle and Robert Rubison. I also thank Tony Amster-
dam for his insights and for setting an atmosphere that encourages lawyering instructors to
pursue scholarly research. Andrea Studley and Loretta Simon provided excellent research
assistance.
I The facts of this scenario are drawn from those of Burke v. State, 624 P.2d 1240, 1241
(Alaska 1980).
2 See id. at 1242.
3 See id at 1243.
4 See id. at 1242.
5 See ia at 1244.
6 Indeed, judges instruct juries to review any witness's testimony carefully, applying to
it any and all tests thatjurors would use in their daily lives. 1 CRIMINALJuRY INSrRUrONS,
NEW YORK § 7.02 (1983).
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M.B.'s passive acceptance of her stepfather's unprecedented solicita-
tion. Even though statutory rape and incest cases do not require force
on the part of the defendant or lack of consent on the part of the
victim, a fact-finder is likely to believe that the "normal" fifteen year
old in M.B.'s position would show some signs of shock, surprise or
resistance. M.B.'s failure to do so, coupled with her subsequent avoid-
ance of the police, would likely undermine her credibility with a jury.
Jurors scrutinizing such a narrative today would also deliberate in
the current atmosphere of disillusionment regarding the credibility of
child victims in sexual abuse cases. Despite the public's education
and acceptance that sexual abuse is prevalent in family settings,7 some
writers have recently described a child abuse "hysteria."8 Children,
some say, will independently fabricate claims of sexual abuse to con-
trol,9 to punish,10 or to cover up their own promiscuity." Some psy-
choanalytic experts still argue that children fantasize, 12 and it has
become increasingly accepted that parents can elicit from their chil-
dren false allegations of sexual abuse where child custody is in dis-
7 See DAVID FINKELHOR, CHILD SExuAL ABUSE: NEW THEORY AND RESEARCH 88-89 (1984).
Finkelhor, in examining the public's knowledge regarding child sexual abuse, views 1978
as the year within which the visual and print media began to present increasing amounts of
information about sexual abuse. Id. at 88. For other examples of press coverage since
1978, see Shari Finnell, SexualAbuse of Children is All Too Rea4 INDINAPOLIS STAR, March 11,
1996, at C2; Michel Marriot, Child Sexual Abuse: Hidden Crimes Come Out of the Closet, WASH.
PosT, June 8, 1984, at Al; Cheryl McCall, Sexual Abuse of Children: The Victims, the Offenders,
How to Protect Your Family, LIFE, Dec. 1984, at 35; Jeannye Thornton, Family Violence Emerges
from the Shadows, U.S. NEws & WORLD REp., Jan. 23, 1984, at 66; Glenn Collins, Studies Find
Sexual Abuse of Children is Widespread, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1982, at Cl; Holly Morris & Rich-
ard Sandza, An Epidemic of Incest, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 30, 1981, at 68. See also Ellen Gray, UNE-
QUALJusTICE 163-70 (1993).
8 For examples of media stories and academic articles promoting the notion of child
abuse hysteria or "witch hunt," see JOHN B. MYERS, The Literature of the Backlash, in THE
BACKLASH: CHILD PROTECTION UNDER FIRE 86, 90-93 (John B. Myers ed., 1994).
9 John C. Yuille et al., Interviewing Children in Sexual Abuse Cases, in CHILD VICTIMS,
CHILD WITNESSES 95, 96 (Gail S. Goodman et al. eds., 1993).
10 Id. See also Lesley Wemberly, The Perspective from Vocal, in THE BACKLASH: CHILD PRO-
TECTION UNDER FIRE 56 (John B. Myers ed., 1994).
11 Child Psychiatrist Roland Summit reports that many hold the stereotype of the se-
ductive young girl playing dangerous games out of her sexual fascination. Roland C. Sum-
mit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 177, 178
(1983) [hereinafter CSAAS]. See also Peter K. Isquith et al., Blaming the Child: Attribution of
Responsibility to Victims of Child Sexual Abuse, in CHILD VICTIMS, CHILD WITNESSES 203, 204-06
(Gail S. Goodman et al., eds. 1993).
12 GRAY, supra note 7, at 164. Roland Summit states that even some clinical specialists
still believe that allegations of sexual abuse arise out of fantasy, confusion or displacement
of the child's wish for the power of seductive conquest. CSAAS, supra note 11, at 179. Jean
Goodwin attributes these clinicians' beliefs to the Freudian principle that incest is based on
fantasy. Jean Goodwin et al., False Accusations and False Denials of Incest: Clinical Myths and
Clinical Realities, in SEXUAL ABUSE: INCEST VICTIMS AND THEIR FAMILIES 17 (1989).
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pute.'3 Several widely publicized courtroom trials have also taught
the public to suspect allegations that children have made against day-
care workers. 14 Thus, despite an increased recognition that child mo-
lestation is a pervasive problem in society, there is also a clear message
that the main, and often only witness to this kind of crime,' 5 may not
be credible.
Given this societal background, the incongruities in M.B.'s story,
and the lack of evidence corroborating her charge, it would not be
surprising to see this defendant acquitted. And yet, M.B.'s narrative
describing her stepfather's conduct and her own behavior might not
be incongruous or implausible at all. For it has become well-accepted
in the psychiatric community that children subjected to repeated acts of
sexual abuse will not struggle or resist, but will accommodate to such
abuse over time, becoming passive and seemingly accepting of repug-
nant sexual acts. 16 Indeed, the phases abused children pass through
and the coping behaviors they develop to adjust to repeated sexual
abuse has come to be known as the "Child Sexual Abuse Accommoda-
tion Syndrome.' u 7 Accommodation as a component of patterned sex-
ual abuse is not only accepted among experts-the courts have also
acknowledged its relevance in cases of long-term incest or sexual
abuse.' 8
M.B.'s stepfather was not charged with sexually abusing her over
a period of time, however, but rather for abusing her only once. The
13 Yuille et al., supra note 9, at 96. Yuille et al. concluded that as of 1983, up to 35% of
sexual abuse allegations in child custody cases were false. While Yuille's percentage has
been sharply criticized, see, e.g., Josephine A. Bulldey, The Impact of New Child Witness Re-
search on SexualAbuse Prosecutions, in PERSPECTIVES ON CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY 208, 216 (Ste-
phen J. Ceci et al. eds., 1989), many do not dispute the principle that false allegations in
this context, while rare, do occur. Id.; Goodwin et al., supra note 12, at 32.
14 See, e.g., Felix v. State, 849 P.2d 220 (Nev. 1993); State v. Babayan, 787 P.2d 805 (Nev.
1990); State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372 (N.J. 1994). For examples of media coverage of
such cases, see Debbie Nathan, Witch Hunt in Wenatchee Over Sex-Abuse Charges, SACRAmENTO
BEE, Dec. 22, 1995, at B-9; Jay Matthews, McMartin Teachers Acquitted: 52 Not-Guilty Verdicts
End Child-Abuse Trial, WASH. Posr, Jan. 19, 1990, at A-1. See also GRAY, supra, note 7, at 166
(reporting that respondents to Gray's poll found the danger of "witch hunts" to be
significant).
15 See Gray, supra note 7, at 17. See also infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
16 CSAAS, supra note 11, at 180. See also Roland C. Summit, Abuse of the Child Sexual
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 1 J. CHILD SExuAL ABUSE 153, 154-55 (1992) [hereinafter
Abuse of CSAAS].
17 CSAAS, supra note 11, at 179, 181.
18 For an overview of the Accommodation Syndrome, see infra notes 91-92 and accom-
panying text. For additional information as to how the courts use and view the Accommo-
dation Syndrome, see Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, The Reliability of Expert
Psychological Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 15 CARDozo L. Rev. 2027 (1994);
John E.B. Myers et al., Expert Testimony In Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB. L. REv. 1
(1989) [hereinafter Expert Testimony].
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other times, beginning at age nine or ten, that this defendant had
abused or tried to abuse her, did not appear in the indictment. 19 The
times he threatened her with a knife to make her submit, and told her
that her mother would put her in a facility if she sought help, all oc-
curred prior to the charged incident.20 Under the rules of evidence,
each of these acts thus carried the designation of "uncharged crimes
or bad acts." 21 In a state like New York, evidence of these acts would
be inadmissible because New York strictly bans the admission of evi-
dence of uncharged crimes in long-term incest or sexual abuse
cases. 22 In such jurisdictions, a defense attorney can thus block jurors
from hearing those components of a victim's narrative that place the
charged acts in a context that would make the incongruous much
more understandable.
New York's approach to uncharged crimes in long-term incest
cases exists at a time when the rules in most other jurisdictions vary
widely, but where most courts generally do allow juries to hear evi-
dence of uncharged crimes in sex crimes cases, despite common-law
and statutory prohibitions on presenting evidence of a defendant's
bad character. 23 The roots of this permissiveness appear to stem from
a belief that rapists and child molesters typically go unpunished due
to "legal technicalities." 24 As a result, many-but not all-states have
bent traditional common law prohibitions regarding uncharged
crimes and admitted them in cases involving rape and child
19 Burke v. State, 624 P.2d 1240, 1246 (Alaska 1980).
20 Id. at 1247.
21 See infra note 23.
22 See People v. Lewis, 506 N.E.2d 915, 916-18 (N.Y. 1987). A minority of states take a
similarly strict position regarding the admissibility of uncharged crimes in cases of long-
term sexual abuse. See, e.g., Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988); State v. Rickman, 876
S.W.2d 824 (Tenn. 1994). Collectively, I refer to such jurisdictions as taking "the NewYork
approach."
23 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). Rule 404(b), which codifies the common-law view, states
that:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissi-
ble for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident...
Rule 404(b) or a common-law analog is in effect in all the states, including New York. See,
e.g., People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 294 (N.Y. 1901).
24 See David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other
Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 23 (1994). See also 137 CONG. REc. S4925, S4928 (daily ed.
Apr. 24, 1991) (statement of Senator Dole) (speaking in support of proposed Rules 413-
415 and warning of "the grave risk to the public if a rapist or child molester remains at
large"). See also STAFF OF N.Y. SENATE COMMITTEE ON CODES, STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF S.
5492A (N.Y.), at 2 (1994) (stating that "[t]he result [of the prior law] is that a large
number of cases in which there is particularly reliable evidence that young children have
been repeatedly sexually abused are either dismissed or compromised").
[Vol. 871388
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molestation.
2 5
Recent federal enactments have injected even more uncertainty
into the issue of the admissibility of uncharged crimes in sex crimes
cases. On January 9, 1995, Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414 and
415 took effect, making a defendant's past history of rape or sexual
abuse presumptively admissible in federal trials involving such
charges.2 6 In effect, the new federal rules reverse both the common-
law prohibition on uncharged evidence of bad character, as well as
FRE 404(b)'s statutory codification of that prohibition.2 7 The new
rules have prompted writings from scholars and practitioners who are
concerned about the creation of special, and perhaps prejudicial,
rules for sex crimes cases. 28 Legal challenge to the new rules on such
grounds seems certain, and the outcome will be significant, not only
within the federal system, but in any state that has adopted or is con-
templating adoption of these rules.29
25 A survey of other states' rationales for admitting uncharged crimes in these cases
reveals a striking inconsistency of approach where many judges routinely stretch Rule
404(b)'s exceptions of "motive," "intent," and "plan" beyond what they were meant to en-
compass. For survey and general criticism of these various approaches, see EDWARD J. IM-
WINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MscouNucr EVIDENCE §§ 3:08, 4:12, 4:13, 5:18 (1984); David P.
Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes"Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REv. 529,
541-44, 546-56 (1994); Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged Mis-
conduct Evidence in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AM.J. Crm. L. 127, 200-04 (1993);John E.B. Myers,
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Child Abuse Litigation, 1988 UTAH L. RExv. 479, 503-07
(1988). Other courts rely on the purported need to show a defendant's "lustftul disposi-
tion" toward his victim, a trait that veers quite close to propensity, and has been expressly
overruled in New York. See People v. Lewis, 506 N.E.2d 915 (N.Y. 1987); see also IM-
WINKELRIED, sup-a, § 4:11; Bryden & Park, supra, at 557-59; Myers, supra, at 538-42; Reed,
supra, at 188-96.
26 FED. R. EVID. 413-415. Since this article looks primarily at criminal cases of child
molestation, Rule 414 is the most relevant of the statutory amendments. It states, in perti-
nent part, "(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of child
molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of
child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to
which it is relevant .... "
27 Karp, supra note 24, at 18.
28 See, e.g., EdwardJ. Imwinkelried, Undertaking the Task of Reforming the American Charac-
ter Evidence Prohibition: The Importance of Getting the Experiment Off on the Right Foot, 22 FoR-
HAM URB. LJ. 285, 285-89 (1995); David P. Leonard, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the
Political Process, 22 FoRDHAm URB. LJ. 305, 333-42 (1995). Other writers, focusing on a
perceived inconsistency between the new rules and Federal Rule of Evidence 403, see the
new rules as flatly violative of due process and equal protection. See, e.g.,Jeffrey G. Pickett,
The Presumption of Innocence Imperiled: The New Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 and the Use of
Other Sexual-Offense Evidence in Washington, 70 WASH. L. REv. 883, 899-902 (1995); Mark A.
Sheft, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: A Dangerous New Frontier, 33 Am. CaRm. L. REv. 57, 76-87
(1995).
29 To date, two states, Missouri and Indiana, have adopted rules of evidence based on
Federal Rules 413 and 414. See Anne Elsberry Kyl, The Propriety of Propensity: The Effects and
Operation of New Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, 37 AiuZ. L. REv. 659, 673 (1995).
Since 34 states have evidence codes modeled on the Federal Rules of Evidence, adoption
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With such challenge likely, it seems all the more appropriate to
examine what could be considered FRE 414's polar opposite, the New
York approach. For if FRE 414 is considered illegally permissive, the
courts will have to consider where proper boundaries regarding the
admissibility of uncharged crimes should lie. Such examination
would show that New York's restrictive extreme is equally unwar-
ranted, for the New York approach is not only doctrinally unsound,
but also has devastating effects on an adolescent's ability to present a
credible narrative in a case of long-term sexual abuse.
This article suggests that in a number of emotionally wrenching
long-term incest cases 30 in New York, judicial roadblocks have unjustly
stacked the deck against the traumatized adolescent complainant 31
who, in order to cope with continuing abuse, accommodates it to the
point where she appears to be a willing participant. More specifically,
the New York courts' overly broad interpretation of its evidentiary rule
barring testimony regarding a defendant's uncharged crimes has pre-
vented such a child victim from explaining for the jury how her dis-
torted and otherwise inexplicably passive reactions to the charged
sexual offenses were shaped by earlier uncharged sexual abuse at the
abuser's hands. By shifting the jury's attention from the defendant's
crimes to the victim's "unfathomable" behavior, the courts have made
it extremely difficult for juries to perceive such victims as credible.
The rule barring uncharged crimes, as the Court of Appeals
stated in People v. Molineux,32 and refined in subsequent cases,33 is that
by other states seems likely. Id. Indeed, given that the Indiana courts had previously ad-
hered to the New York approach to uncharged crimes in sex crimes cases, it appears that
adoption of the new rules may have little to do with consistency to current state law. See
Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334 (Ind. 1992). The military has also formally adopted the
Rules as Military Rules of Evidence 413 and 414. See Lt. Col. Borch, New Military Rules of
Evidence 413 and 414, ARMY LAW, Oct. 1995, at 25-26.
30 For purposes of this article I use the term "incest" to include notjust sexual relations
between biological relatives, but also any repeated acts of abusive sexual conduct to which
a perpetrator subjects a child with whom he has a familial, if not biological relationship.
Thus, for purposes of this article stepfathers as well as paramours of biological relatives of
the child can commit "incest." By "long-term," I refer to a pattern of sexual activity that
begins in childhood and lasts many years, through the adolescence of the young victim.
Finally, although it is certainly true that not all incest victims are female and all perpetra-
tors male, the majority of such cases leads me to use gendered pronouns in this conven-
tional way.
31 Setting adolescence as the time for disclosure and prosecution of long-term incest is
not an arbitrary decision. In cases of long-term incest, children who voluntarily disclose
often do so at an age where they would typically be striving for a measure of independence,
such as adolescence. Perpetrators react to the adolescent's attempts to separate by becom-
ing jealous and even more controlling, which can prompt a disclosure. CSAAS, supra note
11, at 186. Of course, many victims of incest or sexual abuse never disclose what they have
been subjected to. Id at 181.
32 61 N.E. 286, 293-94 (N.Y. 1901).
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a jury may not hear testimony that a defendant previously committed
similar crimes if the sole purpose for introducing such testimony is to
instill the belief that defendant's past propensity makes him responsi-
ble for the presently charged crime. However, the New York courts
also state that if a prosecutor convincingly shows some purpose, other
than criminal propensity, to which the evidence is relevant, the un-
charged crimes could be admitted so long as their probative value out-
weighs the possible prejudice to the defendant.3 4 The rule and its
possible exceptions thus become the battleground for prosecutor and
defense counsel.
In criminal cases generally, the specific permissible purposes de-
lineated by the Molineux court-identity, motive, common scheme or
plan, intent and knowledge 35-have been treated as illustrative and
not exclusive.36 However, in sex crimes cases it is quite rare to see
evidence of a defendant's history of sexual abuse admitted into evi-
dence unless offered for one of these purp9ses.3 7 Enabling a child to
provide the context for her otherwise "incredible" behavior by refer-
ence to a defendant's earlier uncharged crimes is not one of the
stated exceptions, and in fact has been expressly rejected by the Court
of Appeals in New York.38
However, in the last twenty years, rigid adherence to the Court of
Appeals' narrow interpretation of the Molineux "exceptions" has had a
high cost in the most severe cases of prolonged incest, because in such
cases, it has been rare for prosecutors to be able to charge a defend-
33 People v. Hudy, 535 N.E.2d 250, 258-59 (N.Y. 1988); People v. Lewis, 506 N.E.2d 915,
916-17 (N.Y. 1987); People v. Robinson, 503 N.E.2d 485, 488-90 (N.Y. 1986); People v.
Ventimiglia, 420 N.E.2d 59, 62 (N.Y. 1981); People v. Allweis, 396 N.E.2d 735, 738 (N.Y.
1979).
34 Hudy, 535 N.E.2d at 258-59; Lewis, 506 N.E.2d at 917. Rule 404(b) similarly permits
uncharged crimes to be admitted for a non-character or propensity based purpose. FED. 1K
EVID. 404(b). For a circuit-by-circuit list of cases that propound this view, see Sheft, supra
note 28, at 61 n.23.
35 See Molineux 61 N.E. at 294.
36 People v. Garter, 566 N.E.2d 119, 124 (N.Y. 1990); People v. Vails, 372 N.E.2d 320,
323 (N.Y. 1977); People v. Calvano, 331 N.Y.S.2d 431, 435-36 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972). In this
respect too, the New York rule parallels Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), which permits
the introduction of uncharged crimes for "other purposes" and presents the listed excep-
tions as illustrative and not exclusive. See Sheft, supra note 28, at 61 n.23.
37 Typically, the Molineux exceptions that are utilized in sex crimes cases show identity in
a stranger rape situation, where the perpetrator uses a unique modus operandi. See, e.g.,
People v. Dockery, 626 N.Y.S.2d 525, 526 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). Where forcible rape is
alleged, the Molineux exceptions are used to show motive and intent. See People v.
Linderberry, 626 N.Y.S.2d 876, 878-79 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); People v. Castrechino, 521
N.Y.S.2d 960, 961 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). In incest cases, where force is not a statutory
element of the offense and where identity is not disputed, neither of these exceptions
comes into play.
38 Hudy, 535 N.E.2d at 259-61; Lewis, 506 N.E.2d at 918-19.
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ant with every act of statutory rape, sodomy, sexual abuse or incest he
committed against the victim. Jurisdictional restrictions, both geo-
graphical39 and temporal, 40 and notice requirements 41 pruned a large
number of events from a potential indictment, particularly those that
were more remote in time. If the surviving charged counts could
clearly depict for a jury the forces that caused a child to apparently
accept repugnant sexual acts, the child's credibility, and hence, the
truth-telling process, may not have suffered. However, in the most
severe of these cases, where abuse was ongoing for many years and
where the child's emotional defenses were eviscerated well before the
charged acts occurred, it was only by referring to the uncharged prior
instances of abuse that a child could relate a narrative that established
the psychological forces that enabled the defendant to successfully
commit the charged crimes against her.
42
39 County courts have geographical jurisdiction only over crimes committed within the
county. See generally N.Y. GRIM. PROC. § 20.40 (McKinney 1993); see also id. §§ 20.10, 20.20,
20.30, 20.50 (providing requirements for other geographical restrictions).
40 In a state court prosecution, the state's statute of limitations sets time limits within
which cases must be brought. In New York, for example, until August 1996, felony level
sex crimes could not be prosecuted if they occurred more than five years prior to the
commission of the offense. See N.Y. GRIM. PRoc. § 30.10 (McKinney 1992). On August 1,
1996, however, the periods of limitations were extended for certain sexual misconduct
crimes. See N.Y. GRIM. PROC. § 30.10 (McKinney Supp. 1997).
41 The State is required to articulate approximate dates that the alleged crimes oc-
curred in order to charge a defendant with the offenses in an indictment. See N.Y. Grim.
Proc. § 200.50 (McKinney 1993). If a child complainant cannot give with "reasonable cer-
tainty" the date of an act, it cannot be the basis for a charge. See People v. Keindl, 502
N.E.2d 577, 579-80 (N.Y. 1986); People v. Morris, 461 N.E.2d 1256, 1259 (N.Y. 1984); Peo-
ple v. Beauchamp, 532 N.Y.S.2d 111, 113 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
42 In 1996, New York's legislature enacted statutory reforms that tangentially assist a
long-term incest victim in telling "the whole story," because they make more incidents of
sexual abuse chargeable in an indictment. Thus the statute of limitations is now modified
in cases involving child victims by commencing the five year limitations period on the
child's eighteenth birthday, not the date of the crime itself. See N.Y. GRIM. PROc. § 30.10
(McKinney Supp. 1997). Additionally, a new felony offense was created called "course of
sexual conduct against a child." This is a continuing crime in which specific dates need
not be pleaded so long as the victim is less than eleven years old at the time that the
defendant abuses the child. Id. at §§ 130.75, 130.80 The purpose of these reforms, partic-
ularly the latter, is to permit more cases to be brought against molesters of young children.
See N.Y. SENATE COMM. ON CODES, MEMORANDUM ON S. REs. 5492(A). However, a side ben-
efit of the legislation is that in some cases of long-term incest, a complainant will be able to
testify to more acts, because the defendant may be charged with more crimes in the origi-
nal indictment.
However, the reforms do not render chargeable all abuse that a long-term incest victim
may have suffered. Geographical limitations remain, as do specificity requirements for
crimes committed after a child turns eleven years old. These weaknesses are not surprising
where the beneficial effects were unintentional. By failing to confront the Court of Ap-
peals' flawed reasoning regarding the inadmissibility of uncharged crimes in long-term
incest cases, the law will continue to treat the victims of these crimes inconsistently and
unequally; the clarity of a child's narrative and subsequent judgments as to her credibility
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In this article, I suggest that current precedent which bars an ado-
lescent from testifying to uncharged acts that show the context within
which she was abused, is an improper restriction of the Molineux stan-
dard. Continued adherence to this cramped interpretation of the law
will cause some juries to hear fractured narratives of events from teen-
age victims. As a result, jurors are likely to find repeatedly victimized
teenagers unbelievable and the charges against their abusers un-
founded. This danger is, ironically, most imminent in the most severe
cases of Accommodation Syndrome, 43 where the complainant is so
emotionally broken by the early uncharged abuse that she appears to
become an uncomplaining recipient of the often-horrifying charged
offenses.44 In such cases, if juries are to be able to search for the
truth, it is imperative that the courts more fully recognize the ramifi-
cations of long-term incest as a continuing crime with a strong psycho-
logical component that connects one act to another, not a series of
discrete and separate events.45 More importantly, courts must begin
to act on this knowledge in those cases where judges would present
otherwise credible complainants as unfathomable, and hence
unbelievable.
The case study that follows in Part II more specifically illustrates
and explains the problem. Part III traces how the New York courts'
undue restriction of the Molineux rules developed in long-term incest
cases. Part IV examines research and theory regarding jurors' estima-
tions of teenage complainants' credibility generally, and forecasts ju-
rors' likely responses to hearing their fractured incest narratives.
Finally, Part V proposes how courts can use knowledge of the Accom-
modation Syndrome as a guide to develop a uniform response to the
admissibility of uncharged crimes.
11. PEOpLE- V. UA " CAN THIs GiRL BE BELIEVED?
Defendant Joachim Harris46 was charged in 1986 with multiple
counts of statutory rape and sodomy,47 committed against his step-
will hinge on technical rules, not doctrinal soundness or contextual necessity.
43 See CSAAS, supra note 11; see also infra notes 91-103 and accompanying text on the
Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome.
44 CSAAS, supra note 11.
45 People v. Keindl, 502 N.E.2d 577, 581-82 (N.Y. 1986).
46 References to testimony from the case of People v. Harris were derived from the rec-
ord of the trial. Transcript, People v. Harris (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (No. 3357/86) (on file
with author).
47 Brief for Respondent at 1, People v. Harris (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (No. 3357/86). For
statutory definitions of Rape in the third degree and Sodomy in the third degree, see N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§ 130.25, 130.40 (McKinney 1993).
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daughter, Anna B.48 The Harris case graphically demonstrates how
context, or the lack of it, can affect the perception of the credibility of
the young complaining witness. Consider the narrative impact of the
following decontextualized version of the complainant's testimony:
Anna was seventeen years old by the time she testified at trial.4
9
She testified that one night between the first of October and
Thanksgiving of 1984, when she was fifteen years old, her mother
woke her up saying that "dad wants you. '50 She testified that she went
downstairs after her mother into her mother and defendant's bed-
room. She said that when she entered the room, her mother was na-
ked, that her stepfather told her to take her own clothes off and that
she did so unquestioningly. 51 He told her to get in bed with them,
and she complied.5 2 Anna then testified that defendant got "on top"
of her mother, then got off her and got "on top" of Anna.53 At that
point, Anna said, defendant touched her body and had sexual inter-
course with her.54 Anna testified that defendant went back and forth
between herself and her mother "until he was finished."'55 Through-
out the incident neither Anna nor her mother protested, nor did de-
fendant say anything.56 When it was over, Anna said that she returned
to her own room and bed.
57
After this act, Anna testified to a series of sexual acts that defend-
ant perpetrated against her from December 1, 1984 to May of 1986.
5 8
She described the acts sparsely, using similar language for each inci-
dent,59 so similar that the parties eventually stipulated that were she to
48 The name of the complainant in this case has been changed for purposes of this
article.
49 See Transcript Record at 5, Harris (No. 3357/86). In this respect Anna is demograph-
ically typical. In MacMurray's jurisdiction survey, 20% of cases referred to a prosecutor's
office involved complainants over 13 years of age. Bruce K. MacMurray, CriminalDetermina-
tion for Child Sexual Abuse, 4 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 233, 239 (1989). Gray's statistic
across eight jurisdictions was even higher: 25.3% of child complainants were between 13
and 17 years of age. GRAY, supra note 7, at 75 fig.4.3. Goodwin et al., like Summit, found
that disclosures of incest tend to emerge when a family reached the kind of crisis that
occurs as the victim steps toward independence and away from her abuser. Goodwin et al.,
supra note 12, at 23. Such situations often arise during the victim's adolescence. Id.; see
also CSAAS, supra note 11, at 186.
50 Transcript Record at 17, Harnis (No. 3357/86).





56 Id. at 18-19.
57 Id. at 19.
58 Id. at 19-24.
59 Id Anna testified that "I would come downstairs. He had told me to come in and
close the door, lock the door, and he tell me to take off my clothes and he told me to get
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continue testifying regarding them, she would describe each incident
in the same way.60 She also described two more incidents of sexual
intercourse that, like the first, included her mother's participation.
61
During the time period that she said the abuse was occurring, Anna
testified that occasionally her mother "would start complaining about
it," but that Anna would 'just change the subject."62 Finally, Anna
testified that she became pregnant in February of 1986 by her stepfa-
ther and had an abortion in March. 63 These events, she said, led her
to confide in a school guidance counselor in May of 1986, who noti-
fied the authorities.64
I take the view that Anna's passive acceptance of the first act of
rape is so counter-intuitive that it violates our operational notions of
plausibility.65 While a very young child might not be expected to
question or resist an authority figure, the average person would inevi-
tably find it difficult to accept a fifteen-year-old's unquestioning sex-
ual intercourse with her stepfather and mother. Even absent any
suggested motive on the child's part to fabricate, "logical" questions
arise: Why didn't Anna question her mother's arrival in her bed-
room? How could she take off her clothes and get into bed with her
stepfather without protest? Why didn't she leave when her stepfather
began sexual relations with her mother? Why didn't she resist the
defendant when he got on top of her? Why didn't she seek help im-
mediately after such a terrible event? How could the defendant pre-
sume that he could get away with such depravity and that Anna's
mother would be such a willing participant?
In the courtroom, such questions are appropriate if the jury's task
is to measure the credibility of a witness by the plausibility of the
story.6 6 Thus, even if the court instructed a jury that the victim's
young age made any "consent" to these sex acts irrelevant to its delib-
on top of him and he will feel my breasts and my vagina and my rear end with his hand.
Then he would put his penis in my vagina... [and] in my mouth." d. at 19-20.
60 Id at 26.
61 Id. at 27-29.
62 Id- at 30.
63 Id. at 34.
64 1d at 46-48.
65 The incest taboo has been a constant in our culture. See LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF
THEIR OwN LivEs: THE POLMCS AND HISrORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 207-08 (1988). When
such a value is ingrained in our "folk psychology," deviation from the value must be ex-
plaine. See JEROME BRUNER, A=rS OF MEANING 33, 49 (1990). In this decontextualized
version of Anna's history, no explanation for her passivity exists.
66 See, e.g., I CRiMINALJuRY INsTRucrIONS, NEw YoRK, supra note 6, § 7.02 (stating that
"the jury, as sole judges of the facts should ...determine which of the witnesses you
believe, what portions of their testimony you are willing to accept, and what weight you will
give such testimony."). See also People v. Alfred, 580 N.Y.S.2d 52 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
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erations, 67 Anna's apparent readiness to be violated would still seem
flatly unbelievable. Such a negative impression of the victim's credi-
bility with respect to this act must also color the jury's judgment as to
the truth of the later acts Anna describes.
68
Nor would examining the rest of the State's evidence compensate
for the skepticism that Anna's testimony would engender. In this
case, as in many other cases of intrafamilial sexual abuse, there was
little corroborating evidence. 69 The defendant did not confess,
70
there were no eyewitnesses, 7 1 and no medical evidence linked Anna's
sexual activity to the defendant.72 Indeed, the only State's witness
who testified to something other than Anna's hearsay statements7 3 was
an older half-sister, who testified to seeing Anna go into defendant's
bedroom on several occasions. 74 While such testimony might raise
some suspicions of impropriety, it seems highly unlikely that such evi-
dence would persuade ajury beyond a reasonable doubt of a defend-
ant's guilt.
Placing Anna's decontextualized and unsupported story against
the defendant's competing narrative renders her version of events
67 See People v. Lewis, 506 N.E.2d 915, 918 (N.Y. 1987).
68 It is common for ajudge to instruct the jury that if the jury disbelieves a witness as to
any material part of that witness's testimony, the jury is free to disregard the whole of the
witness's testimony. See People v. Perry, 14 N.E.2d 793, 796 (N.Y. 1938); People v. Bruno,
431 N.Y.S.2d 106, 107 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
69 Because the abuse occurs in a private setting, the potential for finding witnesses is
often nonexistent. See MacMurray, supra note 49, at 236. Further, because the victim's
disclosure is usually quite delayed, little or no physical evidence is generally recovered. Id.
This is quite true in Anna's case, where she alleged that defendant took polaroid photos of
her naked and the two of them in an act of sodomy, but no pictures were recovered. See
Transcript Record at 42-43, Harris (No. 3357/86); see also GRAY, supra note 7, at 91-92 (find-
ing that in 53.2% of cases referred to prosecutors across eight jurisdictions, there was
neither medical evidence nor eyewitnesses); Theodore P. Cross et al., Prosecution of Child
SexualAbuse: Which Cases are Accepted? 18 CHiLD ABUSE AND NEGLECr No. 8, 663, 670 (1994)
(finding that 55% of cases referred to prosecutors were based wholly on the complainant's
testimony).
70 Confessions were found in approximately 32% of cases that prosecutors actually took
to trial, according to Cross et al., supra note 69, at 666; Gray found that across eight juris-
dictions prosecutors relied on defendant's statements in 37.2% of the cases they accepted
for prosecution. GRAY, supra note 7, at 97.
71 Cross et al. found eyewitnesses in 15% of referred cases. Cross et al., supra note 69, at
666; Gray's survey found eyewitness testimony in 19% of referred cases. GRAY, supra note 7,
at 91.
72 Gray found that 39% of cases referred for prosecution included no medical evidence
and that another 35.2% of cases included evidence that was only suggestive of abuse. GRAY,
supra note 7, at 91 & fig.4.14. She suggests that the lack of such evidence may in part result
from the uneven quality of medical examinations. Id. at 91.
73 New York, like most states has a "prompt outcry" exception to the hearsay rule that
permits a witness to testify to the victim's initial disclosure of her sexual assault. See, e.g.,
People v. McDaniel, 611 N.E.2d 265, 268 (N.Y. 1993).
74 See Transcript Record at 110-11, Harris (No. 3357/86).
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even more implausible. The competing story that the defense devel-
oped was that Anna was a disrespectful teenager who fabricated the
charges, because she hated living at home, and because she was trying
to cover up her own sexual activity with a boyfriend. 75 In support of
that story the defense extensively cross-examined Anna.76 In addition,
the defendant's mother testified that Anna hated living at home and
taking care of her siblings and admitted to having sex with her boy-
friend a short time before her abortion.77 The defendant's son also
testified on defendant's behalf, claiming that Anna frequently paid
-him so that she and her boyfriend could have sex in his bedroom.78
The competing narrative is powerful because it draws upon nega-
tive stereotypes regarding teenagers. Indeed, the defendant's seventy-
two year old 79 mother succinctly evoked the picture of the disrespect-
fial and rebellious teenager when she testified:
Q: How did [your relationship with Anna] change?
A: Because you know, prior to that she was such a beautiful child.
She, er-she wasn't streetwise like, you know. But when she came to the
house that day she was chewing gum and clicking it at me.
Q: Okay, and after that day you did not have such a nice
relationship?
A- No. I said, oh, wow, has she changed.
Q: Okay. And, you mean she changed by chewing gum or did she
change in other ways?
75 The defense spent relatively little time trying to disprove Anna's allegations. On the
acts themselves, Anna was cross-examined regarding the very young siblings that she testi-
fied slept through incidents of abuse that she suffered at the hands of defendant. See id. at
59-64, 102-06. She was also cross-examined regarding statements that she had previously
made to the police and a child welfare worker. Id. at 68-72, 75-77. Finally, she was cross-
examined regarding defendant's birth control practices or lack thereof. Id. at 85-87.
Neither defendant nor her mother testified at the trial.
76 Anna was repeatedly questioned about her "boyfriend," Paul Y. Id. at 56-58, 78-79,
90, 96-99. The focus of the cross-examination was that on several occasions before March
of 1986, Anna and Paul would use her younger brother's room to be alone. Id. A sample
of the testimony is as follows:
Q: Do you know whether Paul paid [your brother] any money to use his room?
A-- Yes ....
Q: How much would he pay him?
A: A dollar. A dollar.
Q: And how long would you be in the room with Paul?
A: About a hour.
Q: And you would just be there sitting and talking?
A: We were talking, kissing.
Q: Ever go any further than that?
A: No.
Q: Did you ever go---did you ever go to bed with Paul in your brother's room?
A: No.
I& at 98-99.
77 Id. at 183-86.
78 Id. at 161-66.
79 Id. at 179.
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A: No, just her overall appearance. She had all that makeup on
and then to keep her hair down she had it glued down with grease, you
know.
Q: I see.
A: And all this makeup on and, you know, the way she was talking
and it just seemed streetwise, you know, that she had completely
changed. And I told her father that.8 0
The defendant's story is thus a proverbial story of put-upon par-
ents and rebellious children, based upon existing stereotypes, that the
defense took to an extreme. It is a story that is so familiar within soci-
ety that it can easily be summarized in a sentence or two.8 ' Further,
because it does resonate so well with societal stereotypes, it sharpens
the sense that Anna's "implausible" story cannot be true.
8 2
However, before judging Anna's decontextualized story as flatly
unbelievable, consider how one's view of Anna's description of the
charged acts might change if she were permitted to put those events
into the context of an escalating pattern of abuse that was initiated
when Anna was five years old, and had by age fifteen rendered her
passive and incapable of protest. In fact, defendant began by fondling
Anna when she was five, by removing her clothing and touching her
on her buttocks and in her vaginal area.83 By the time she was eight,
defendant was getting on top of her and trying to have intercourse,
but Anna's cries kept him from actually penetrating her.8 4 By age
eleven, defendant succeeded in penetrating her vaginally and began
placing his penis into her mouth and vagina on a regular basis. 85 By
this time, Anna did not testify to any physical resistance on her part.
During this uncharged time period, Anna did try to get help and
failed. Defendant had told her never to tell anyone or he "was going
80 Id. at 191-92.
81 Proverbial stories or narratives are so familiar and so accepted within our culture
that they allow us to simplify and to avoid attending to every detail of a given scenario.
Peggy Cooper Davis, The Proverbial Woman, 48 R~c. Ass'N B. CITn N.Y., 7, 11-12 (1993).
Such stories contrast sharply to those that would seem to violate cultural norms, and which
thus require a more lengthy explanation to make them meaningful and acceptable to the
listener. See BRUNER, supra note 65, at 47.
82 The simplicity of this stock story is reminiscent of the stock stories told as to why
women accuse men of acquaintance rape or sexual harrassment. Such stories as "the wo-
man scorned" or confused about her sexuality are similarly based on negative stereotypes
and are so simple as to overpower a much more complex narrative from the woman victim.
Mary I. Coombs, Telling the Victim's Story, 2 TEx.J. WOMEN & L. 277, 290-91, 295-96, 299-300
(1993); Kim Lane Scheppele,Just the Facts, Ma'am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits, and
the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 123, 135-36, 137-38 (1992) [hereinafter Sexual-
ized Violence].
83 See Transcript Record at 8-9, Harris (No. 3357/86).
84 Id. at 11-12.
85 Id. at 16.
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to do something" to her.8 6 Despite the threat, she told her mother,
whose response was to tell Anna that it was up to her to get defendant
to stop.8 7 She was eight years old at the time.88 Over the subsequent
years, Anna's mother also told her that disclosure would mean the
breakup of the family.8 9 After her mother failed to help her, Anna's
stepfather dominated her completely. She kept the secret and be-
came incapable of resisting defendant, physically or emotionally.90
Does this context answer or shed light on the plausibility of
Anna's narrative? The pattern of abuse that defendant subjected his
stepdaughter to is consistent with the well-accepted clinical view of
long-term molestation described by Roland Summit as the Child Sex-
ual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome ("Accommodation Syn-
drome").91 This "syndrome" is actually a pattern of behaviors that
depicts the phases of a long-term incest relationship based on clini-
cians' observations of sexually abused children. By briefly digressing
to examine these phases or behaviors in closer detail, we can see just
how early incest experiences shape and define the subsequent re-
sponses of a victim like Anna.9 2
The Accommodation Syndrome phases or behaviors-secrecy,
helplessness, accommodation, disclosure and retraction 93-typically
occur in cases where the abuser, like Joachim Harris, is in a caretaking
and apparently loving position with respect to the victim.94 Such a
perpetrator is in the best position to engage a child to accept sexual
behavior.95 Once the initial sexual activity occurs, that activity is char-
acterized by secrecy, that is, the victimizer conveys to the child that she
is not to tell anyone of the abuse. The defendant is able to secure
86 Id. at 14.
87 I
88 Id. at 15.
89 Id. at 36-37.
90 Id. at 36-38.
91 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
92 No expert testified regarding Accommodation Syndrome at this particular trial, held
in 1986. Since that time, it has become increasingly common for experts in New York to
testify in a general way about Accommodation Syndrome, where such testimony will edu-
cate jurors as to how sexually abused children react to their abusers. See People v. Keindl,
502 N.E.2d 577, 583 (N.Y. 1986); People v. Benjamin R., 481 N.Y.S.2d 827, 832 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1984).
93 CSAAS, supra note 11, at 181.
94 Id. at 182.
95 Id. at 181. Sgroi has coined a separate phase based on the relationship between
victim and victimizer, called the "engagement phase." Sgroi uses this phrase to refer not
only to the relationship, but to the behaviors defendant uses to induce the child to partici-
pate in sexual behaviors or acts. Suzanne M. Sgroi et al., A Conceptual Framework for Child




secrecy, because the child does not understand the reality of the expe-
rience; she is dependent on the perpetrator for whatever reality he
assigns to it. When he tells her that the act must be kept secret, the
inference that the child draws is that she has done something bad or
dangerous that she cannot reveal. Consequently, while some perpe-
trators secure secrecy by means of intimidation, threats of violence are
usually unnecessary. The perpetrator can use the child's shame and
fears of abandonment to maintain secrecy.
96
Keeping the secret causes the child to react with helplessness to
additional acts of sexual abuse. While children may make some at-
tempt to avoid sexual activity (for example, by feigning sleep at
night), children do not naturally or normally resist perpetrators who
they depend upon for love or family security. Minimal acts of avoid-
ance are easily overcome because of the perpetrator's constant
access. 97
Since the child cannot tell, cannot resist, and cannot avoid, she
responds by accommodating to the abuse, that is, by becoming passive
and seemingly accepting of the abuse. Accommodation allows a child
like Anna to accept the abuse and survive. She comes to believe that
she is responsible for what is happening to her, and that she must
keep her family intact by cooperating with her abuser. While the
child's passivity allows her to survive emotionally, it also permits and
encourages the perpetrator to escalate his sexual demands without
fear of disclosure. 98 Thus, Joachim Harris had little to fear from Anna
when he involved her in his sexual activity with her mother.
The pattern of abuse and accommodation ends where there is
disclosure,9 9 which will usually be followed by pressure to retract or
suppress the outcry 0 0 of sexual abuse. 10 1 This pressure emanates
from other family members who cannot accept that the perpetrator
could commit these acts, cannot cope with the breakup of the family
that disclosure generally requires, or cannot bear the stigma they feel
that outsiders will attach to them. Those who cannot pressure the
child into recanting may instead attempt to undermine the child's
96 CSAAS, supra note 11, at 181; Goodwin, supra note 12, at 22.
97 CSAAS, supra note 11, at 183.
98 Id. at 183-85.
99 Id at 186. Disclosure can be accidental if, for example, another person observes
sexual behavior or finds out that the child has a sexually transmitted disease. See Sgroi,
supra note 95, at 17-19. Disclosure can also be purposeful. See CSAAS, supra note 11, at
186.
100 "Outcry" is a term of art in sex crimes cases which refers to the victim's disclosure to
another person that she has been sexually abused. See supra note 69.
101 CSAAS, supra note 11, at 188.
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credibility to others. 10 2 Children who do not go so far as to recant will
often refuse to talk about the incest experience or testify.10 3
That the Accommodation Syndrome has a clinical label and wide-
spread clinical support' 04 should not shroud its logical core from the
layperson. Indeed, to consider the Accommodation phases within the
specific example of Anna's experience, the early events in Anna's life
should make the illogic of the charged events more understandable,
even to a layperson. One can instinctively envision that a child sub-
jected ata very young age to gradually escalating acts of abuse would
come to accept that as her reality and be less likely to resist over time.
One can consider that conclusion even more foregone if the person
this child has confided in, her mother, the person who should be
most protective of the child, has utterly betrayed her. Perhaps the
only remaining question is why the child would ever make any disclo-
sure under such circumstances.
To prevent the jury from hearing this "whole story" would seem
as unfair to the truth-finding process as would denying the defendant
the opportunity to fully respond to the charges. Yet, despite the sig-
nificance of the evidence of earlier abuse to understanding Anna's
passivity and defendant's emboldened behavior, jurisdictional and no-
tice requirements prevented the State from charging defendant with
these acts in the indictment. Many acts occurred before the five year
statute of limitations then in effect, 05 many occurred in California
and Queens, New York, 10 6 not Brooklyn, and many occurred when
Anna was between ages twelve and fifteen, but she could not date
them with any reasonable specificity.10 7 Because these events could
not be charged, this conduct took on the legal designation of "un-
charged crimes" and became subject to strict judicial scrutiny before
admission of Anna's testimony regarding those acts could be
considered. 1
08
Thus, in a pretrial conference, the State moved to permit Anna to
testify regarding these uncharged crimes, in order to provide neces-
sary context for the charged offenses. 10 9 The prosecutor argued to
102 Sgroi, supra note 95, at 24-27.
103 Goodwin et al., supra note 12, at 27.
104 See Goodwin et al., supra note 12; Sgroi, supra note 95; see also DAVID P.H. JONES,
INTERVIEWING THE SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILD: INVESTIGATION OF SUSPECTED ABUSE, 7-9 (1985).
105 Those acts that Anna described that occurred more than five years before the date of
defendant's arrest, May 19, 1986.
106 See Transcript Record at 7-15, Harris (No. 3357/86).
107 Id. at 16-17.
108 See People v. Harris, 541 N.Y.S.2d 593, 595 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).




the court that the testimony of years of escalating sexual abuse prior
to the charged events was essential to the "continuity of the case, and
to an understanding of the victim's conduct."110 That the deviant
conduct began so early in Anna's life helped explain her attitude and
behavior regarding the defendant's offenses, including her failure to
disclose the defendant's abuse to anyone prior to 1986.111 In oppos-
ing the motion, the defense argued that the evidence was inflam-
matory and irrelevant to the charged offenses.
112
The trial court ruled that Anna would be permitted to testify re-
garding the uncharged offenses. The court found that the testimony
was "necessary" in order to give "fabric and texture to the entire
case."' 13 Thus, as the trial proceeded, Anna was able to describe
chronologically how the abuse began and how it escalated. The jury
was able to understand Anna's growing accommodation to the abuse
and her resulting passivity. The charged offenses were thus placed in
a context that did not seem wholly incredible.
The jury convicted the defendant of multiple counts of statutory
rape and sodomy. On appeal, however, the appellate court reversed,
finding that the admission of defendant's uncharged crimes was im-
proper. 114 In its decision, the appellate court made no effort to com-
pare the charged and uncharged offenses to see if the latter shed
necessary light on the former. Instead, the court characterized the
uncharged offenses as "merely cumulative, and was not offered to
prove an element of the crimes charged." 115
The appellate court's sketchy analysis of the facts was somewhat
predictable, because higher authority in New York had previously spo-
ken directly to the issue in an equally abbreviated way. In People v.
Lewis,116 the Court of Appeals reversed a trial judge's decision to per-
mit a fourteen-year-old girl to testify to her father's ten uncharged acts
of rape to explain why she didn't resist her father throughout the one
charged offense. 117 The Court of Appeals held that such testimony
would improperly buttress, bolster or credit the complainant, instead
of provide necessary context."I8 In turn, the Harris court relied on the
Lewis decision when it stated that "enhancement of the complaining wit-
ness's credibility [is not] one of the recognized exceptions to the Moli-
110 Id.
111 Id. at 3.
112 Id.
113 Id,
114 People v. Harris, 541 N.Y.S.2d 593, 594 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
115 Id. at 595.
116 506 N.E.2d 915 (N.Y. 1987).
117 Id at 916.
118 Id at 918.
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neux rule."119
By placing the uncharged acts within the paradigm of "buttress-
ing"' 20 or "enhancing"'121 credibility, the Harris court maintained the
legal fiction that long-term incest is a series of discrete and independ-
ent acts. 122 Viewed in such a fashion, the Harris decision is logical-if
uncharged act A does not shed light on charged act B, then act A
serves no purpose, except to bolster the complainant and prejudice
the defendant.
123
However, by relegating the uncharged facts to the "bolstering"
paradigm without discussing them in any detail, the court itself al-
tered Anna's narrative. 124 Decontextualized, Anna's testimony is in-
congruous; that artificial incongruity gives the defendant a significant
advantage in presenting his stock story of teenage rebellion. On the
other hand, had the court laid out the facts behind the charged and
uncharged crimes, it would have been difficult to say that the progres-
sion of events over time served no purpose except to improperly
credit the complainant. To the contrary, the contextualized narrative
allowed both complainant's and defendant's stories to be carefully
scrutinized using traditional tests of credibility.
The Harris result is not an isolated one. Since the Court of Ap-
peals decided People v. Lewis, numerous courts have mechanically ex-
cluded evidence of prior sexual contact that a defendant has
perpetrated against a child victim without considering whether the
exclusion is doctrinally sound.125 In addition to these cases, prosecu-
tors have no doubt declined to pursue numerous others, because a
complainant's description of the charged counts under Lewis would
sound incredible. It is, therefore, well worth reviewing the doctrinal
underpinnings of Lewis, to determine whether new consideration of
the subject of uncharged crimes is appropriate.
119 Harris, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
120 Lewis, 506 N.E.2d at 918.
121 Harris, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
122 People v. Keindl, 502 N.E.2d 577, 581-82 (N.Y. 1986).
123 Or as the Lewis court stated, a witness's "allegations concerning defendant's prior
actions did not render [that witness's] testimony pertaining to the charged crime more
trustworthy because a witness cannot buttress her own testimony by making further unsub-
stantiated accusations." Lewis, 506 N.E.2d at 918.
124 See Robert Garcia, Rape, Lies and Videotape, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 711, 729 (1992)
("[t]he summary of the facts on appeal is an interpretation that reflects the values of the
appellate judge writing the opinion and is many layers removed from 'what really
happened'").
125 People v. Singh, 588 N.Y.S.2d 573 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); People v. Gautier, 544
N.Y.S.2d 821 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); People v. Sosa, 535 N.Y.S.2d 596 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988);
People v. Bruce A., 529 N.Y.S.2d 593 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
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III. PEoPLE v. LEws." THROWING THE BABY OUT WI=
THE BATHWATER
The admissibility of uncharged crimes in cases of long-term sex-
ual abuse has see-sawed wildly since 1901, when the New York Court of
Appeals set out its rules for the admissibility of uncharged crimes in
criminal cases. 126 In Molineux, the Court of Appeals followed the com-
mon law view that convicting a defendant based on his or her propen-
sity to commit past crimes was repugnant. 127 However, at the same
time, the court recognized that evidence of past crimes could, at
times, establish something other than mere propensity. The now-fa-
mous exceptions listed in the decision-identity, motive, common
scheme or plan, intent and knowledge-are examples of legitimate
purposes for which uncharged crimes may be admitted.128 The ex-
ceptions have become so ingrained that any criminal law practitioner
can rattle them off with ease. Yet the Molineux court itself stated that
the exceptions to the rule could not "be stated with categorical preci-
sion, ' 129 and subsequent courts have considered the exceptions to be
illustrative, not exclusive.130
In the years since the Molineux decision, New York courts have
moved beyond these illustrative exceptions and admitted uncharged
crimes where those acts provided necessary context and background
to the narrative of the charged offenses.' 3 ' For example, in People v.
Ricotta,13 2 where the defendant was accused of acting in concert with
another to start a fire in his family's building, the court deemed de-
fendant's uncharged prior arson of his family's previous residence,
"inextricably interwoven into the transaction forming the basis of the
charge ... and completed the narrative of the episode.' 33 In People v.
Tabora,'34 an undercover police officer was permitted to testify not
only to the drug sale that constituted the charged offense against a
defendant, but also to defendant's prior sale of drugs to him, in order
to complete the narrative as to how the charged transaction came
126 People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286 (N.Y. 1901).
127 Id. at 293-95.
128 d at 294.
129 Id.
130 See cases cited supra note 33.
131 People v. Gines, 335 N.E.2d 850 (N.Y. 1975), was one of the first cases where the New
York Court of Appeals approved the admission, in a robbery trial, of the victim's testimony
regarding a subsequently committed, but uncharged rape, on the grounds that it com-
pleted the victim's narrative of the entire episode and established her opportunity to iden-
tify defendant as her assailant.
132 498 N.Y.S.2d 422 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
133 Id at 422.
134 527 N.Y.S.2d 36 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
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about. 3 5 In People v. Civitello,'8 6 the court permitted the admission of
evidence of the defendant's uncharged prior assaults against a witness
in order to explain why the witness felt compelled to inform the au-
thorities of defendant's charged activities.' 37 In People v. Bernard,
138
where defendant was on trial for murder, witnesses were permitted to
testify to defendant's many uncharged crimes as leader of their gang.
The court found that the uncharged crimes were necessary to explain
to the jury the unique relationship between defendant and the wit-
nesses, who were by virtue of their common gang membership, privy
to defendant's activities relevant to the charged crimes.'3 9 The com-
mon thread to each of these decisions appears to be ajudgment that
barring testimony regarding the uncharged offenses would render the
witness's testimony subject to doubts that would not occur if the testi-
mony was placed in proper context.
In relatively recent cases, the courts have utilized the context ex-
ception to admit past bad acts that a defendant has committed against
a witness which have had the effect of emotionally warping the witness
to such a degree that the witness's behavior would seem incredible
without the contextual background. For example, in People v.
LeGrand,140 defendant, a cult leader, was accused of murdering two
women during a party for the sixty-odd members of his "church.'
4 '
One cult member, who acted as "guard" while the murders were being
committed, testified on behalf of the prosecution, while another
member of the cult confessed in open court to having committed the
murders himself.142 The trial court deemed it appropriate for the
prosecution to prove by way of defendant's prior bad acts, the total
domination and control that he had over members of his cult.143 The
trial court found, and the appellate court agreed, that it was only by
way of these acts that ajury could understand whether these witnesses
acted freely, both on the night of the murder and at the trial itself.
More generally, the court found the acts necessary to explain why the
defendant would not hesitate to murder in front of sixty potential wit-
nesses.' 44 In LeGrand, the uncharged acts so affected the witnesses
that without the benefit of this context information, it is likely that the
135 Id at 38.
136 543 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
137 I at 1006.
18 637 N.Y.S.2d 692 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
139 Id.
140 431 N.Y.S.2d 850 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
141 Id. at 850-51.





jury would have flatly disbelieved the prosecution's account of the
charged offenses.
Similar concern with context is evident in People v. Steinberg'145 In
Steinberg, the defendant was accused of killing his six year-old adopted
daughter. Defendant's common-law wife testified at the trial that she
saw the defendant carry the unconscious child out of the bedroom
and lay her on the floor, and that he told the witness that he would
take care of the child when he returned. 46 The witness further testi-
fied that she took no steps to aid the child while the defendant was
away, but felt compelled to obey his instructions.147 It was that feeling
of compulsion that the court found required explanation, and to that
end, it was necessary for the witness to explain that defendant had
physically abused the witness for years, so severely that she lacked the
free will to take any steps on behalf of her child.148 Without this con-
textual information, the court held, the witness's testimony would
seem "patently incredible." 49 In holding that the uncharged assaults
were admissible, the court relied on the "ample case law" supporting
the proposition that uncharged crime evidence may be used to sup-
port testimony that otherwise might be unbelievable or suspect.
150
In a general sense, the LeGrand and Steinberg courts validated the
proposition that "acts" do not have real meaning unless they are con-
sidered in their contextual setting, within the mutually interacting
states of the participants. 51 More specifically, these decisions demon-
strate that the context principle for admissibility of bad acts can in-
clude acts that emotionally warp and desensitize individuals who
continue to interact with each other over time. As the victimizer's acts
traumatize the victim, the victim exhibits aberrant behavior. By the
time the charged acts occur, the victim's behavior is so abnormal that
without explanation, a jury is likely to reject it out of hand. 52 The
'45 573 N.Y.S.2d 965 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991), affd, 595 N.E.2d 845 (N.Y. 1992).




150 Id. In its decision, the court relied on People v. LeGrand, 431 N.Y.S.2d 850 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1980); People v. Civitello, 543 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); People v. Fay, 444
N.Y.S.2d 629 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
151 See Bruner, supra note 65, at 19.
152 For other cases in New York where courts used the context/narrative exception to
fully define the relationship between an abusive defendant and his victims, see People v.
Shorey, 568 N.Y.S.2d 436, 437 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991); People v. Mendez, 564 N.Y.S.2d 241 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1990). For examples of cases where the exception has been utilized in other
jurisdictions, see People v. Abrams, 631 N.E.2d 1312, 1320 (Il1. App. Ct. 1994); State v. Currie,
400 N.W.2d 361, 367 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Ryan, 444 N.W.2d 610, 630 (Neb.
1989); State v. Frost, 577 A.2d 1282, 1291 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990); State v. Young, 346
S.E.2d 626, 636 (N.C. 1986); State v. LaRock, 470 S.E.2d 613, 631 (W. Va. 1996); State v.
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parallels with a case like Anna B.'s seem immediately apparent. 153
However, while the context/narrative exception as applied to
cases outside the realm of intrafamiial sexual abuse has developed in
a consistent way, the rules applied to this subset of cases have been
much more inconsistent. The inconsistency does not stem from an
initial misapplication of Molineux itself. Instead, it originates in the
separate rules regarding sex crimes that have waxed and waned as
Molineux has progressed, rules that have tracked society's changing
views of women and children over the years.
While Molineux principles descended to American jurisprudence
by way of the British courts, the early English courts did not prosecute
offenses such as incest, fornication and adultery in the criminal
courts.'5 4 Such matters were handled by ecclesiastical courts, which
operated on the principle that these offenses related to status, that is
to what the parties were, not what they had done, and were subject to
proof by evidence of specific instances of sexual activity.155 In such
cases, proof of specific acts between the parties was deemed relevant
to show their "lustful disposition," and thus to prove their illicit
Status. 15
6
Because these courts had no jurisdiction in the American colo-
nies, some of the colonies enacted statutes criminalizing incest, forni-
cation and adultery.' 57 However, it was not until the latter part of the
19th century that the women's rights movement began to lobby for
enforcement of statutes to protect both women and children. 158 By
that time, a dichotomy existed among those in authority 59 regarding
child victims of sexual abuse. On the one hand, there was an outcry to
protect women and children, who were viewed as virginal creatures
who could easily be defiled by men, which led to stepped up enforce-
ment of incest and statutory rape laws.160 On the other, even many of
Shillcut4 341 N.W.2d 716, 720 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983), af[d, 350 N.W.2d 686 (Wis. 1984).
153 Scheppele suggests that placing the legal event itself, "the trouble," into context in-
stead of confining the story to the event, is an approach in legal storytelling that tends to
make "outsiders" more comprehensible to a legal audience. Kim Lane Scheppele, Telling
Stories, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073, 2097 (1989). To the extent that the law can begin to em-
power the outsider, the context/narrative exception is an evidentiary device that can be
utilized for that purpose.
154 Reed, supra note 25, at 164.
155 1d. at 166.
156 Id.
157 Id
158 GRAY, supra note 7, at 9; GORDON, supra note 65, at 27.
159 "Authority" refers chiefly to those middle-to-upper-class individuals who worked for
social welfare institutions. These individuals most frequently interacted with perpetrators
and victims of child abuse and were largely responsible for initiating and prosecuting child
abuse cases in the courts. See GORDON, supra note 65, at 20, 37, 48, 52-55, 217.
160 Reed, supra note 25, at 168. See also Martha Minow, Whatever Happened to Children's
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the early reformers had prudish views of incest victims as polluted and
unredeemable. 161 It may be this latter view that prevented the courts
from recognizing incest victims as true victims, distinguishable from
adulterers and fornicators. 162 However, by adhering to the common
law association, the courts also continued to make the defendant's
"lustful disposition" a matter that could be proved at trial by way of
uncharged crimes, despite Molineux's ban on proof of bad
character.1
63
In 1914, The NewYork Court of Appeals appeared to resolve the
inconsistency with Molineux by overtly validating, in prosecutions for
adultery, seduction, statutory rape and incest, an uncharged crime ex-
ception, where the uncharged crime consisted of other sexual con-
duct between the defendant and complainant.164 In People v.
Thompson, a statutory rape case, the court approved the admission of
the uncharged acts, because the conduct showed "the existence of a
sexual passion between [the parties'] as elements in proving that they
had illicit connection . . . on the dates charged."165 While "passion"
would seem interchangeable with "propensity," the court distanced
the Thompson ruling from the prohibitions of Molineux in two respects:
First, it deemed the uncharged acts "corroborative" of the charged
crimes, 166 instead of demonstrative of defendant's propensity to com-
mit the charged crimes. Second, by continuing to ascribe to the victim
the same "passion" or "mutual disposition"167 as the defendant, the
court seemingly distanced its exception from the emphasis on the de-
fendant's character that Molineux condemned.
However, while post-Thompson courts followed the rule of law set
down in the case, the underpinnings distinguishing it from Molineux's
prohibition on proving bad character began to crumble. In the 1960s
and 197 0s, clinicians began to publicize their conclusions that victims
of statutory rape and incest were unlikely to share a "passion" for their
abusers. 68 By the 1980s, experts were beginning to testify in court
Rights, 80 MINN. L. REv. 267, 278-79 (1995).
161 See GORDON, supra note 65, at 14, 215-16, 219.
162 People v. Freeman, 50 N.Y.S. 984, 987 (N.Y. App. Div.), affid, 50 N.E. 1120 (N.Y.
1898); Boyd v. State, 90 N.E. 355, 356 (Ohio 1909).
163 Reed, supra note 25, at 168.
164 People v. Thompson, 106 N.E. 78 (N.Y. 1914).
165 Id. (quoting Director of Public Prosecution v. Ball, 6 Crim. App. Rep. 31, 47 (Dec.
15, 1910) (Lord Chancellor)).
166 Id at 79.
167 Id.
168 GRav, supra note 7, at 12. Finkelhor examined the studies of the 1960s, 1970s and
1980s in his review of the research on child sexual abuse. He summarized this research by
concluding that children are incapable of truly consenting to sex with adults, both because
they don't know what they're consenting to, and because they don't have the true freedom
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regarding children's traumatized responses to repeated acts of sexual
abuse. These experts established that a defendant's sexual control
over a child rendered the child more and more passive and less likely
to resist or outcry against her abuser.169 By 1985, the state legislature
was so aware that sexual abuse engenders long-lasting trauma and not
passion, that it authorized children's testimony over closed-circuit tel-
evision in certain cases of child sexual abuse, where the victim would
be demonstrably traumatized by testifying in the defendant's
presence.
170
Accordingly, the courts began to tone down the rhetoric of "mu-
tual disposition." In People v. Yonko,' 71  mutual passion was
recharacterized as "the ongoing relationship and conduct between
and among the parties .... -"172 In People v. Fuller,173 mutuality receded
entirely and mutated into a need to "show defendant's amorous
design."174
to say yes or no. FINKELHOR, supra note 7, at 17.
169 See, e.g., People v. Keindl, 502 N.E.2d 577, 583 (N.Y. 1986); People v. Benjamin R.,
481 N.Y.S.2d 827, 831-32 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). Courts in many other jurisdictions also
began admitting such testimony regarding the reactions and responses of children sub-
jected to repeated sexual abuse. See, e.g., Sexton v. State, 529 So. 2d 1041 (Ala. Crim. App.
1988); Rodriquez v. State, 741 P.2d 1200 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); State v. Spigarolo, 556
A.2d 112 (Conn. 1989); Ward v. State, 519 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); People v.
Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391 (Mich. 1990); Smith v. State, 688 P.2d 326 (Nev. 1984); State v.
Newman, 784 P.2d 1006 (N.M. Ct App. 1989); State v. Bailey, 365 S.E.2d 651 (N.C. CL
App. 1988); State v. Middleton, 657 P.2d 1215 (Or. 1983); State v. Hicks, 535 A.2d 776 (Vt
1987); State v. Robinson, 431 N.W.2d 165 (Wis. 1988); Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741 (Wyo.
1993).
170 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW. §§ 65.00-.30 (McKinney 1992). New York's statutory provi-
sions comport with the national trend to permit the use of closed-circuit television testi-
mony in criminal child abuse proceedings in most states and the federal government. See
18 U.S.C. § 3509(b) (Supp. 1996); ALA. CODE § 15-23-3 (1995); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046
(Michie 1996); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4251, 4253 (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1347 (West Supp. 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86g (1994); DEL- CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 3514 (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.54 (West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-855 (Supp.
1996); HAW. R. EVID. 616; IDAHO CODE § 19-3024A (Supp. 1996); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 5/106B-5 (Supp. 1997); IND. CODE § 35-37-4-8 (Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE § 910A.14(1)
(Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3434 (1995); Ky. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (Banks-
Baldwin 1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:283 (West 1992); MD. CODE ANN., CT. & JUD.
PRoc. § 9-102 (1995); MICH. COMP. LAws § 600.2163a (Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT.
§ 595.02(4) (Supp. 1997); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-403 (Supp. 1996); N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 2A84A-32.4 (Supp. 1996); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.41, 2937.11(B) (Anderson
Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 753 (West 1992); OR. REv. STAT. § 40.460(24)
(1995); RI. GEN. LAws § 11-37-13.2 (1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 26-8A-30, 31 (Supp.
1997); TEX. CRIM. P. CODE ANN. § 38.071 (West Supp. 1997); UTAH R. CraM. PROC. 15.5(2);
VT. R. EvID. 807; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.9 (Michie 1996); WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.44.150
(Supp. 1997).
"71 316 N.E.2d 338 (N.Y. 1974).
172 1& at 339.
'73 409 N.E.2d 834 (N.Y. 1980).
174 Id. at 839 (emphasis added).
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Ironically, it is this more appropriate way of viewing the child vic-
tim that seemed to underscore the Lewis decision in 1987,175 which
banned the admission of a defendant's uncharged sexual abuse of his
victim in cases of statutory rape. Once "mutuality" disappeared, the
Court of Appeals was left with the defendant's "amorous design," a
phrase that no longer seemed so different from propensity; admitting
uncharged sexual offenses for reasons of propensity seemed flatly vio-
lative of the Molineux rule. Indeed, the Lewis court held as much, con-
cluding that "amorous design" could only be a legitimate exception to
the Molineux rule when both the victim's and defendant's "amorous
designs" were relevant to the charge.176 Because a victim's consent is
irrelevant in a case of statutory rape, the court stated, the uncharged
prior crimes are also irrelevant.
177
Nor did Thompson's language of "corroboration" hold sway with
the Lewis court. It found that corroboration of the victim's testimony
was not necessary, since the legislature had removed corroboration
requirements for child victims who were deemed competent to tes-
tify.178 Even if it was required, the court did not find "the unsubstanti-
ated accusations" of the child victim regarding uncharged crimes to
be corroborative of the charged events.
1 79
While abolishing "amorous design" or "lustful disposition" as an
exception to the prohibition on uncharged crimes may have been log-
ically appropriate under Molineux, the Lewis court effectively pre-
empted consideration of the admissibility of these uncharged crimes
pursuant to the developing context exception followed in Gines and
Ricotta.180 Indeed, the court made no attempt to determine whether
or not the uncharged crimes could still be admissible pursuant to any
Molineux exception, and the absolute language of the decision has
prevented any court since Lewis from making that inquiry. Each case
decided after Lewis has summarily reversed statutory rape convictions,
even where uncharged crimes did establish the same kind of context
considered admissible in Steinberg and LeGrand.81
The closest that the courts have come to reconsidering un-
charged crimes in incest cases in light of the context exception oc-
175 See People v. Lewis, 506 N.E.2d 915, 918 (N.Y. 1987).
176 Id.
177 l
178 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 60.20 (McKinney 1993).
179 Lewis, 506 N.E.2d at 918.
180 People v. Gines, 335 N.E.2d 850 (N.Y. 1975); People v. Ricotta, 498 N.Y.S.2d 422
(N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
181 People v. Steinberg, 573 N.Y.S.2d 965 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991), aff'd, 595 N.E.2d 845
(N.Y. 1992); People v. LeGrand, 431 N.Y.S.2d 850 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
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curred in the dissenting opinion in People v. Singh.'82 The majority
opinion in Singh, like Harris, is notable for its dearth of information
regarding the facts of the case. Beyond listing the charges, 183 the ma-
jority omitted any description at all of the kinds of acts defendant was
charged with committing against his daughter, as well as any descrip-
tion of the five years worth of earlier uncharged crimes. As in Harris,
such omissions enabled the court to apply the Lewis rule summarily
without considering whether or not a context exception might apply.
The dissent pointed out the flaws in such a summary approach,
emphasizing that when the nineteen-year-old complainant testified,
she related a pattern of abuse that began many years before.'
8 4
Through her testimony regarding the early uncharged offenses, the
complainant established the dynamics of her relationship with the de-
fendant, explaining both how these crimes continued to be commit-
ted against her and why she did not act to protect herself at an earlier
date. 8 5 The dissent quoted the complainant's testimony to explain
her failure to outcry until so many years had passed. The abuse:
... started when I was a very little girl, and he led me to believe that I was
supposed to be doing this. And, if I ever did state to him that I thought I
shouldn't be doing this, he said that I was supposed to, he would fulfill
all my needs. Once again, he made me feel very guilty, that I wasn't
good enough for him, that I wasn't good enough, period.'
8 6
The dissent concluded that testimony like this about the un-
charged offenses was necessary to truly show the defendant's domi-
nance over the complainant, to explain her failure to outcry and to
show how the crimes charged in the indictment were alleged to have
actually been committed. To give this conclusion legal viability, the
dissent relied on the context/narrative exception followed in other
cases.' 8 7 The dissent did not ignore Lewis, but it framed the case as
precedent that abolished the "amorous design" exception in New
York, not as precedent that precluded consideration of uncharged
crimes under any other Molineux exception. 88
It should not be considered accidental that Singh, decided in
1992, is one of the most recent cases in New York on the issue of
uncharged crimes in long-term incest cases. The context exception,
182 588 N.Y.S.2d 573, 577 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (Miller, J., dissenting).
183 Id. at 574.
184 I& at 577 (Miller, J., dissenting).
185 Id. (Miller, J., dissenting).
186 Id- at 578 (Miller, J., dissenting).
187 Id. (Miller,J., dissenting) (referring to People v. Steinberg, 573 N.Y.S.2d 965 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1991), aff'd, 595 N.E.2d 845 (N.Y. 1992); People v. Shorey, 568 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1991); and People v. Mende;, 564 N.Y.S.2d 241 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)).
188 Id (Miller, J., dissenting).
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while established before Lewis was decided, has become more ac-
cepted and relied upon in more recent years. To note this may ex-
plain in part the judicial blinders of the Lewis court. On the other
hand, the drastic implications of Lewis for the credibility of a trauma-
tized incest survivor makes reconsideration of the context exception
both timely and appropriate.
IV. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF LE-yS ON INCEST VICTIMS'
PERCEIVED CREDIBILITY
The intuitive "that's not fair" that a prosecutor would inevitably
cry at the result in Harris could be more easily dismissed as partisan
grumbling, if the rule's deleterious effects on adolescent complain-
ants' credibility were not so well supported by social science research
into jury decision-making. Such research leads to the conclusion that
a truncated narrative that does not comport with jurors' expectations
or experiences is likely to be rejected out of hand. Jurors are likely to
find witnesses putting forward these abbreviated narratives to be
incredible.
Pennington and Hastie's important work on jury decision mak-
ing' 89 gives strong support for the principle that jurors organize the
information they receive in a trial by imposing a story-type structure
on that information. Such processing means that information that
may come in bits and pieces from different witnesses, documents or
physical evidence will be translated by jurors into a narrative, that is, a
series of events or episodes that begins, peaks and resolves. 190 This
encoding is more than mere process. Imposing a story structure on
information is a comprehension strategy for understanding and as-
sessing human action. 91 Once the juror assembles the story, he or
she is able to compare it with knowledge that the juror has already
encoded throughout his or her life. 192
The "fit" of the trial story with the stories embedded in the per-
189 Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model, 13 CAruozo L. REv. 519 (1992).
See also Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for
Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALnIY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 189 (1992); Nancy Pennington
& Reid Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision Making: Effects of Memory Structure onJudgment, 14J.
OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 521 (1988).
190 Pennington & Hastie, The Story Model, supra note 189, at 526.
191 Id, at 527.
192 Id. Pennington and Hastie's conclusions complement the view of cognitive psycholo-
gistJerome Bruner, who advocates that what binds a culture together is not only its shared
norms and beliefs, but its ability to explain deviations from those shared beliefs by use of
narrative or storytelling. Bruner finds in cultural inhabitants a predisposition to organize
experience into narrative forms and plot structures to make the happening of an event or
events comprehensible. BRUNER, supra note 65, at 45-51.
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sona of each juror is of critical importance in determining the out-
come of a trial.193 Not only do jurors examine trial stories for
comprehensiveness and coherence, but they seek to match them with
the stories and experiences of their own lives. Specific world knowl-
edge about events similar to those in dispute will determine whether a
particular interpretation is accepted or rejected.
194
Pennington and Hastie's conclusions regarding the power and in-
evitability of story formation comports with the views of other scholars,
social scientists and practitioners. 195 Thus, advocates attempt to weave
evidence into a consistent story that is likely to mesh with jurors' own
assessments of what is coherent and what comprehensively explains
the evidence.' 96 The simpler the story can be, that is, the less it devi-
ates from the societal norm and requires explanation, the more likely
it is to resonate with jurors' experiences and be accepted.'
97
The difficulty arises when evidence is not comprehensive enough
to fall into a familiar narrative form. Where jurors perceive "gaps" in
the storyline, they must return to their own worlds and "fill in" the
trial narrative with inferred events which may have nothing to do with
trial evidence. 198 Indeed, litigators exploit perceived gaps in their op-
ponents' stories, by urging jurors to fill in these gaps with the juror's
own fixed views of the world. 199 To the extent that the juror's world
view is shaped by experiences, stereotypes or beliefs that contradict
the narrative being offered, the tactic is likely to be successful.
200
193 Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing Arguments to aJury, 37
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 55, 57 (1992).
194 Pennington & Hastie, The Story Mode4 supra note 189, at 529. Pennington and Hastie
based their conclusion on simulated jury experiments where jurors rendered different ver-
dicts over time even though the fact patterns presented were the same. The only differ-
ence in presentation was in the stories "attorneys" framed for the jurors based on those
facts.
195 See, e.g., W. LANcE BENNETr & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE
COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGEMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 89-90 (1981); Amsterdam &
Hertz, supra note 193. See also Mark Cammack, In Search of the Post-Positivist Jury, 70 IND. LJ.
405, 462-77 (1995); Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L.
REv. 681, 688-89 (1994); Davis, supra note 81, at 11-12; Richard Lempert, Experts, Stories and
Information, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1169, 1175 (1993); Scheppele, supra note 153, at 2080-82.
196 Pennington & Hastie, The Story Mode supra note 189, at 522.
197 Amsterdam & Hertz, supra note 193, at 76; Sherwin, supra note 195, at 689.
198 Pennington & Hastie, The Story Mode supra note 189, at 536.
199 Sherwin, supra note 195, at 689.
200 Amsterdam and Hertz provide one example of this tactic in their analysis of a closing
argument to a jury in a murder trial, where the sole issue was whether the defendant had
the state of mind that made him guilty of murder (intent to kill) or manslaughter (reck-
lessness). In that case, the defense was able to put forward to the jury its own narrative, in
part by pointing out that the prosecutor's evidence of intent was ambiguous and far differ-
ent from the stereotypical cold-blooded killer who kills for an identifiable motive, takes
purposeful aim and punctuates the killing with a dramatic remark. In offering this portrait
of an intentional killing, the defense substituted a stock story familiar through the popular
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Is an acquittal under such circumstances "wrong" or "unjust?" I
would suggest that where the "gap" results from a natural deficiency
in the evidence it is neither. For example, a defense attorney tells
jurors that a certain defendant, during a physical fight, killed a victim
in self-defense. If the defendant has no apparent injuries or marks
that would support the notion of a struggle, it is completely appropri-
ate for jurors to rely on their own knowledge of brawling to decide
whether or not such a scenario makes logical sense. Indeed, judges
constantly instruct jurors to rely on their own experiences and knowl-
edge in deciding whether or not a story is credible. 20 1
However, if a rule of evidence excludes existing evidence that is
an integral part of the storyline, the jury's dismissal of the narrative
and subsequent acquittal of a defendant is less satisfactory. It is true
that the rules of evidence are framed to avoid this result: Evidence is
presumed admissible unless its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.20 2 If the
gap-filling evidence would be considered probative, the presumption
weighs toward admission, unless a defendant demonstrates overriding
prejudice.20 3
There are many specific examples of rules of evidence that, when
considered within the paradigm of narrative or storyline, do preserve
a story's integrity. For example, certain kinds of hearsay must be ex-
cluded from evidence, but such hearsay is admissible where it is neces-
sary to explain a witness's state of mind and subsequent actions,20 4
something that would be considered integral to a narrative line. Simi-
larly, lay witnesses may not give opinions thatjurors could reach them-
selves, and which, thus, would not be necessary to advance a narrative,
but expert opinions are admissible when such opinions will give the
jury the specialized knowledge that will allow it to interpret the "facts"
of a case.205 So too, in virtually all criminal cases, the courts bar evi-
media, for the ambiguities in the prosecutor's case. Amsterdam & Hertz, supra note 193, at
59, 105-06.
201 See 1 CRIMINALJURY INSTRUCTIONS, NEw YoRK, supra note 6, § 7.02 (stating "[e]ach of
you brings to this jury all the experience acquired in your private life. In your everyday
affairs you make ajudgment on the reliability or unreliability of statements made to you by
others. The same tests which you apply in your everyday dealings should apply in your
deliberations as jurors.").
202 See FED. R. EvID. 403.
203 Id. See also People v. Hudy, 535 N.E.2d 250, 267 (N.Y. 1988) (Wachtler, J.,
dissenting).
204 See FED. R. EVID. 803(3). See also People v. Ricco, 437 N.E.2d 1097 (N.Y. 1982); Peo-
ple v. Wood, 27 N.E. 362 (N.Y. 1891); People v. Goodman, 399 N.Y.S.2d 56, 57 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1977).
205 See FED. R. EVID. 701, 702. See also People v. Cronin, 458 N.E.2d 351, 352-53 (N.Y.
1983); Doughery v. Milliken, 57 N.E. 757, 759 (N.Y. 1900). Indeed, Lempert argues that
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dence of the victim's consistent after-the-fact renditions to police or
other witnesses, unless to rebut suggestions of recent fabrication.
20 6
While helpful to ajury, such consistency is likely to be presumed until
attacked, and hence, not integral to a storyline. Yet in sex crimes
cases, the same courts permit testimony as to a victim's prompt outcry
that she has been raped or sexually abused because "it is natural to
expect that the outraged female will make prompt disclosure to a per-
son upon whom she might rely."20 7 The report thus becomes a part of
the story itself.
2 0 8
In contrast with the preceding examples, where the probative/
prejudice balance still preserves a narrative storyline, the wholesale
preclusion of early sexual behavior between defendant and complain-
ant in long-term incest cases has such a devastating effect on narrative
formation that jurors are denied the ability to render a just verdict
based on the evidence. In fact, long-term incest cases uniquely re-
quire narrative development, and truncating such development can
consistently render this kind of case unbelievable and unprovable.
A. THE NATURE OF THE LONG-TERM INCEST CASE
Not all criminal cases require a prolonged storyline structure for
the crime itself to be understood by ajury. In many cases, the story of
a crime is not in dispute, only the identity of the perpetrator. For
example, where an intruder burglarizes a home in the middle of the
night, assaults the victim, steals money and is apprehended days later,
the defendant may not choose at trial to contest the fact of the bur-
glary itself. Instead, the defense could attack the prosecution's con-
tention that this defendant committed what is conceded is a crime.
Narratives would undoubtedly be told throughout the course of this
burglary trial, but there is little possibility that they would center on
proof of or attack on the prosecution's claim that the victim was bur-
glarized.20 9 So too, in deliberations the jury would be unlikely to de-
bate the story of the crime itself; that story would be accepted as
given.210
the importance of expert testimony lies in the expert's ability to fill in gaps in a narrative
line. See Lempert, supra note 195, at 1175-76.
206 See People v. Davis, 376 N.E.2d 901, 905 (N.Y. 1978); People v. Coffey, 182 N.E.2d 92,
94 (N.Y. 1962).
207 WiLLLtAm RICHARDSON, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 292 (8th ed. 1955) (emphasis added).
208 While he does not directly address the narrative paradigm, Imwinkelried has sug-
gested that the most important evidentiary concept is "logical relevance," and that logical
relevance transcends each specific rule. IMWINMELRIED, supra note 25, at ix.
209 Such narratives are likely to center on the victim's ability to observe and later identify
the perpetrator or on the investigatory techniques of the police.
210 Pennington and Hastie suggest that where the issue in a criminal case is solely the
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However, in long-term incest cases, there is no defense of mis-
taken identity. Jurors are called upon to decide whether the prosecu-
tion's narrative of the crimes themselves could have, in fact, occurred.
This, in turn requires an assessment of the description of the charged
events. Lawyers will argue over, and jurors will scrutinize, particular
components of the story, such as whether or not others who lived in
the home should have been aware; whether the victim could have
acquired her knowledge of sexual acts in another way; whether her
reasons for keeping the incest secret sound plausible. Once the jury's
attention is focused on the story of the crimes as presented by the
prosecution, the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt re-
quires that the story be comprehensive and coherent.211 To the ex-
tent that necessary contextual information is omitted, the narrative
becomes less comprehensive, less coherent and less credible.
212
B. THE TELLER OF THE TALE AND THE INCEST DYNAMIC
While technically it is always the prosecution's burden to present
the story of the crime, the one-witness nature of long-term incest cases
places the storytelling burden squarely on the shoulders of the adoles-
cent complainant-victim. In this respect too, long-term sexual abuse
differs from other kinds of crimes, which may take place in front of
witnesses or produce physical evidence.213 In these cases, where the
jury hears a largely uncorroborated storyline, a double burden exists:
both the story and the teller must comport with the expectations a
jury would have about both sexual abuse and the victims of sexual
abuse.214 Because such victims are so often subject to attack on their
identity of the perpetrator, story creation analysis may not be descriptive of the way jurors
process information. Pennington & Hastie, The Story Mode4 supra note 189, at 551. On the
other hand, where the decision in a criminal case rises and falls based on the credibility of
witnesses, jurors will frequently tell themselves stories, invoking assumptions that corre-
spond with their cultural communities. See Cammack, supra note 195, at 479.
211 In this regard, long-term sexual abuse is not unique. Virtually any kind of criminal
charge can support a "what happened" defense. However, long-term incest cases are never
"who did it cases," and always involve a determination of the child's credibility in making
her accusations.
212 Bruner states that for narrative to resolve deviation from the norm in a comprehensi-
ble fashion, the teller must be able to relate a narrative not just sentence by sentence or
event by event, but within whatever cultural framework is necessary to allow the teller to
share her interpretation of the events with the listener. See BRUNER, supra note 65, at 64.
213 See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text. See also Myers et al., supra note 18, at
37-45.
214 Child victims of long-term sexual abuse are similar, in this regard, to adult victims of
rape or sexual harrassment. For further exploration of the "he said-she said" nature of
these cases, see Scheppele, supra note 82. For discussion as to how the law diminishes
"non-traditional" acquaintance rape victims, see Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087
(1986).
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character, temperament and honesty, it becomes even more impor-
tant for the young victim to testify comprehensively-to fully explain
the pattern of abuse the defendant has subjected her to.
215
Teenage girls are particularly vulnerable to negative judgments
regarding their credibility. In simulated sexual abuse trials where only
the age of the victim was manipulated, researchers found that jurors
tended to find girls over twelve years of age to be significantly less
credible than adolescent girls under the age of twelve.216 As research-
ers polled theirjurors, they found that as victims entered adolescence,
jurors perceived them as partly responsible for the abuse they were
subjected to, and that belief correlated with a decrease in their per-
ceived credibility.217 This correlation held with a significant number
ofjurors, even when consent was not an issue at trial, and the jurors
were specifically instructed to that effect.
218
In this respect, the skepticism people demonstrate toward teen-
age sexual abuse victims is similar to the skepticism that greets adult
victims of acquaintance rape.219 However, even if adult women face
serious obstacles in pressing claims of rape, teenage incest victims face
even more. For in the case of a defendant accused of raping an adult
woman, consent is a defense and it is within the jury's purview to con-
sider evidence of the victim's consent.220 In long-term incest cases,
which are brought primarily under statutory rape provisions, and
where jurors are specifically instructed that "consent" of the victim is
irrelevant, attributions of responsibility to the victim are
inappropriate.
The incest dynamic itself can also affect the credibility of the trau-
215 Lempert suggests that when juries are unaware of the stories that can plausibly ex-
plain witness testimony, ajury is unlikely to merely defer to the witness, and more likely to
disregard the testimony. Lempert, supra note 195, at 1177.
216 See Isquith et al., supra note 11, at 203, 204-07.
217 Id. at 209.
218 Id. at 223. Indeed, one study suggested that an extremely explicit instruction could
cause a "boomerang effect" where jurors would find teenage complainants even less credi-
ble. Id. at 216-22. The authors hypothesize that jurors who find their freedom infringed
react to restore that freedom in "acceptable" ways, here by finding such complainants to be
more suggestible. Id. at 221.
219 See Bette Bottoms, Individual Differences in Perceptions of Child Sexual Assault Victims, in
CHILD VICrIMS, CHILD WITNESSES, supra note 9, at 233. Attributions of responsibility to the
victims of acquaintance rape and sexual harrassment underlie some of the gender rape
myths that women will lie to hide their sexual complicity or that they confuse the truth with
sexual fantasies of rape. See also Coombs, supra note 82, at 282; Estrich, supra note 214, at
1140-41.
220 See N.Y. PENAL. LAW §§ 130.00(8), 130.35(1) (McKinney 1987). To prove first degree
rape, the State must prove that a defendant acted by means of forcible compulsion, which
is defined as "use of physical force; or... a threat, express or implied, which places a
person in fear of immediate death or physical injury to... herself... or in fear that.., she
... will immediately be kidnapped." Id. § 130.00(8).
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matized teenage storyteller, because such victims do not tend to testify
in ways that jurors would typically expect. Just as victims of long-term
abuse tend to become more passive over time with their abusers, so
too can they withdraw from others; they are plagued by low self-es-
teem, and their communication and social skills are often weak.221 Ju-
rors who expect an incest survivor to relate a narrative in an
expressive, direct and tearful way are likely to be disappointed. On
the contrary, it is entirely likely to see such a witness testify flatly, with-
out emotion, tears or even eye contact.2 22 While some prosecutors
might elect to call expert witnesses to try to educate the jury as to the
link between trauma and demeanor,223 such experts might be of lim-
ited use with ajury pool that has educated itself by way of "L.A. Law"
and the sexual abuse TV movie of the week.
224
Finally, severe trauma from long-term molestation can also cause
a victim to recant her allegations prior to trial. Recantations can oc-
cur as a result of pressure applied to a young victim by other family
members, but they can also arise from the traumatized victim's own
desire after her outcry, to preserve the family unit.225 Assuming that
the victim regains the strength to pursue her initial complaint, the
fact of her recantation becomes one more incongruity that is difficult
to explain without reference to the entire pattern of the sexual acts.
Underlying all these obstacles facing the adolescent complainant
are the stock stories or negative stereotypes that consistently portray
teenage girls in a negative light. Indeed, media and popular culture
consistently portray adolescent girls as conniving, would-be seduc-
tresses of unwary men.226 The few actual cases where the evidence
221 See Sgroi et al., supra note 95, at 112-20.
222 Gray's trial observers found that in one-third of the observed trials involving children
of all ages and sexual abuse of varying degree and length, children described the abuse
flatly, that in a significant number of trials observed, the victims avoided any kind of eye
contact, and that children broke down and cried in only 14% of observed cases. GRAY,
supra note 7, at 156. In the more severe and long-term cases of sexual abuse, these passive
reactions could be even more prevalent.
223 In order for such expert testimony to be placed before the jury in a state like New
York, the trial court would have to rule that a victim's flat demeanor is explained by Ac-
commodation Syndrome and that jurors would not normally expect this demeanor from
one who has been repeatedly sexually abused. See People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131, 135-36
(N.Y. 1990); People v. Keindl, 502 N.E.2d 574, 583 (N.Y. 1986).
224 Once internalized, these stereotypes or schemata resist change. People tend to avoid
and discount conflicting information, and seek out corroboration of the stereotype. See
Ronald A. Farrell & Malcolm D. Holmes, The Social And Cognitive Structure Of Legal Decision-
making, 32 THE Soc. Q. 529, 533 (1991).
225 See Sgroi et al., supra note 95, at 24-26; CSAAS, supra note 11, at 188.
226 See JOSEPH W. REED, AMERICAN ScENARIos: THE USES OF FILM GENRE 144-46 (1989),
for a description of the sexually promiscuous teenaged girls and helpless older men that
populate the "high school genre" in film. Reed also notes the presence of the "vicious girl
clique" that plots against the innocent protagonist(s). Id. at 155.
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suggests that adults were wrongfully accused of molestation, primarily
in the daycare area, receive so much publicity that it is easy to expand
upon them to negatively generalize about children and adolescents. 227
That people internalize these stereotypes is not necessarily blame-
worthy; stereotypes are important organizing structures that provide
the holders with a manageable way to view the world. 228 However,
while the thought process itself should not be condemned, the courts
should correct the legal inequity that exacerbates the process's nega-
tive result. It defeats the truth-finding function of the jury when de-
fense attorneys can routinely tap into these pre-existing stereotypes
without giving the victims the opportunities to provide the context
that might level the playing field.
Absent this context, jurors' unfounded adoption of the stock sto-
ries will not only affect their perception of the victim's credibility, but
will also play into the competing narrative that the defense will gener-
ally put forward in a long-term incest case.229 That is, a defendant
will, through cross-examination of prosecution witnesses or through
defense witnesses, tell the jury a story as to why the victim should not
be believed.2 0 Where narratives compete in such a head-to-head way,
jurors will look for the one that "rings true" in terms of their own
227 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. For additional examples of media stories
focusing on false allegations by children, see William Claiborne, No 'Healing' in Wenatchee;
Girl's Change of Testimony Rekindles Charges of Witch Hunt in Sex-Ring Case, WAsH. PoSr, June
14, 1996, at Al; Jack Puerling, What Happened to' Innocent Until Proven Guilty of a Crime?
Proposed Legislation Makes It Easier to Falsely Accuse People of Child Abuse, MILwAUKEEJ. & SENTI-
NEL, Dec. 20, 1995, at 17.
228 See Farrell & Holmes, supra note 224, at 532.
229 The defense attorney in the Harris case capitalized on such stock storytelling in his
questioning of witnesses regarding Anna's "boyfriend." See supra notes 76-78 and accompa-
nying text. Such questioning is common. In another case where the State alleged that a
fourteen year old girl had been raped and sexually abused by her stepfather, the defense
attorney ended his cross examination of the complainant by attempting to suggest that her
accusations were made to mask her own promiscuity:
Q: Do you know somebody named Fabian?
A- Yes.
Q: Did you have a boyfriend named Fabian?
A. No. Fabian was never my boyfriend.
Q: Did Fabian go to school with you?
A. Yes.
Q: And did you and [your older brother] Jorge at one point go to the school forJorge
to speak to Fabian about you having him as a boyfriend?
A- No, that is not true.
Q: Was there a conversation thatJorge went to school to have with Fabian?
A- No.
Transcript at 85, People v. Martin Narranjo (Kings County Indictment No. 1173/90) (tried
Oct. 31, 1990) (on file with author).
230 See, e.g., People v. Porcaro, 160 N.E.2d 488 (N.Y. 1959); People v. Respass, 623
N.Y.S.2d 337 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995), rev'd, 653 N.E.2d 635 (N.Y. 1995); People v. Green-
hagen, 433 N.Y.S.2d 683, 684, (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
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experiences. 231 If the child's narrative is truncated in such a way as to
raise skepticism regarding the child's credibility, the competing narra-
tive is that much more likely to be accepted.
C. THE ADVANTAGES DEFENDANTS HAVE OVER COMPLAINANTS IN
CREATING COMPETING NARRATIVES
A defendant in a case of long-term sexual abuse has advantages
over a complainant in the construction of a competing narrative.
First, a defendant has the advantage of simplicity. As much as a prose-
cutor will try to simplify a narrative of continuing incest, this kind of
storyline is not subject to simplification. Even where a jury can view
the entire pattern of abuse, jurors must still attend to dates and de-
scriptions of sexual acts, remember who was present in the house for
each act described, and scrutinize any threats of force or retaliation
that a defendant might have made, either in the beginning or over
time. In addition, jurors must attempt to understand and accept the
underlying dynamic that would explain the defendant's acts, the vic-
tim's trauma and her subsequent responses.
A defendant putting forward a competing narrative need not
make any attempt to refute the allegations on a date-by-date basis or
attempt to explain his own psychology. He need only generally deny
the allegations (through himself or his attorney), and either explicitly
give or implicitly suggest to the jury a reason as to why the complain-
ant would make a false allegation.232 Since these reasons will gener-
ally capitalize on myth and stereotype, they have the advantage of
simplicity:233 The victim was a rebellious teenager trying to get back at
a disciplinarian defendant;234 she blamed defendant for acts she con-
231 Pennington and Hastie found that jurors who heard competing narratives, or "both
sides of the story," tended to be more confident in their decisions than jurors who heard
only one side. Pennington & Hastie, The Story Model, supra note 189, at 543. Such "confi-
dence" would seem to exacerbate any discomfort jurors might have with a truncated or
partial narrative.
232 Again, the parallel to adult victims of acquaintance rape is apparent. See Coombs,
supra note 82, at 282.
233 Id.
234 See, e.g., Soper v. State, 731 P.2d 587, 589 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) (defendant claimed
that complainant had always been a problem child, and that she had run away from home
because of her inability to get along with her family); Respass, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 337 (defend-
ant claimed that complainant had always hated him and was therefore fabricating charges
against him); People v. Karst, 560 N.Y.S.2d 577, 578 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (defendant
claimed that complainant was a troubled child who made up her allegations out of anger
and to get attention); People v. Laundry, 504 N.Y.S.2d 840, 841 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)
(defendant argued that complainant fabricated charges to gain sympathy from a relative);
Greenhagen, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 683 (defendant argued that complainant made up her allega-
tions in part, because he enforced strict rules about her dating).
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sensually engaged in with a boyfriend; 235 she accused him, because
her mother put her up to it.236 These stories are so simple that if an
inexplicable gap exists in the complainant's storyline, the competing
narrative is likely to ring true to many jurors.
237
Second, in devising a competing narrative, a defendant often can
capitalize on the trauma that he has inflicted upon his victim because
that trauma can cause the complainant to engage in negative behav-
ior. Repeated and constant sexual abuse can cause victims to react by
being rebellious and hostile at home, or by running away from
home.23 8 Victims of this kind of abuse can become sexually promiscu-
ous out of a belief that it is the only way to get attention or love.23 9 A
defendant who has brought about such behavior by way of his own
crimes can thus reap benefits: He can give his narrative enough
"smoke" based on actual events to direct the listener to adopt his story
of false accusation.2
40
In a system where the jury must decide between competing sto-
ries, the only viable way to proceed is to let each party put his or her
narrative before the jury. However, in so doing, it becomes crucial to
permit the victim to give the jury enough background into the
charged offenses to illuminate the context within which the abuse oc-
curred. Only at that point can jurors intelligently judge whether the
narrative itself makes logical sense and whether the teller of the tale is
credible.
V. EXPLORING THE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE ACCOMMODATION
SYNDROME AS A PARADIGM FOR CONTEXT
Once it is apparent that a victim of long-term incest may be
placed at a significant disadvantage, one that is legally inconsistent
235 See, e.g., People v. Martin Narranjo (Kings County Indictment No. 1173/90) (tried
Oct. 31, 1990). See also the discussion of People v. Harris, supra notes 76-78; Lloyd v. State,
No. 239-1990, 1991 WL 247737, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 1991) (unpublished disposi-
tion) (defendant claimed that complainant fabricated allegations due in part to his animus
against her boyfriend).
236 See, e.g., State v. Getz, 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988) (defendant argued that his wife used
the complainant to create a misconduct ground for their divorce); People v. Porcaro, 160
N.E.2d 488, 492 (N.Y. 1995) (defendant claimed that child's mother manipulated child
into making allegations); People v. Williams, 591 N.Y.S.2d 390, 391 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)
(defendant claimed that complainant's mother, under the influence of hallucinations, per-
suaded the child to fabricate charges).
237 This result is consistent with those theorists who argue that the stories of "outsiders"
are routinely excluded from the courtroom. See Scheppele, supra note 153, at 2084.
238 See CSAAS, supra note 11, at 186; Goodwin et al., supra note 12, at 23.
239 See CSAAS, supra note 11, at 186.
240 For an exploration as to how male defendants exploit weaknesses in the narratives of
complainants in rape and sexual harrassment cases to further their own narratives of false
accusation, see generally Scheppele, supra note 82.
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with the context exception to Molineux, the challenge lies in determin-
ing the limits of the incest storyline. How far back in time should a
court go in determining that previous acts should be admitted as nec-
essary context information?
Emphasizing the need for a full narrative is inherently problem-
atic because a story can begin and end anywhere that the teller deems
appropriate. 241 Stories consist of events that take place among actors,
which in turn give rise to new events.242 In fact, narrative episodes can
continue not only as the actors continue to interact, but even after
they stop.243 This lack of "natural" beginnings and "natural" end-
ings244 is particularly evident in attempting to determine the story of a
crime committed within a family, where the parties act and react to
each other years before and years after the actual "crime" occurs.
Theoretically, a narrative of long-term sexual abuse could "begin"
during defendant's childhood, well before the victim is even born,
and these events could foreshadow defendant's later molestation of
his own child. Yet, while such a narrative might be psychologically
illuminating, 245 few would argue that it would or should be within the
bounds of admissible evidence.
I suggest that we look back at the difficulty facing the incest com-
plainant in presenting her narrative, to seek some limits as to the nar-
rative's "beginning" and "end." That is, the unfairness of Harris and
Singh is that the curtain rises on the victim's unexplained and incon-
ceivable passivity: her cooperation with her assailant in particularly vi-
olative acts; her failure to prevent their reoccurrence; and her failure
to disclose the acts to anyone. In determining what, if any, prior con-
duct the jury should learn of, a court should focus on conduct that
will help the jury understand the array of forces that have caused this
passivity. Drawing this line in the sand is also consistent with the con-
text exception to the Molineux rule, which would deem prior conduct
probative if it is necessary to explain the actions and reactions of the
defendant 246 or the complaining witness.247 Thus, before trial, upon
241 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Excerpts From the Files of a Never-Published Article on Prigg v.
Pennsylvania and Freeman v. Pitts as Narratives with an Invitation to a Campfire, 31-32 (un-
published manuscript on file with author).
242 See Amsterdam & Hertz, supra note 193, at 63 n.19.
243 For example, in a long-term incest setting, events that occur between defendant and
complainant that give rise to the complainant's outcry can prompt resentment among fam-
ily members, even after defendant and complainant no longer have contact. If family
members pressure the complainant to recant or go out of their way to demean the com-
plainant, this, in turn, can affect the story of the trial itself.
244 Amsterdam, supra note 241, at 31.
245 See, e.g., Fox BUTTERFIELD, ALL GOD'S CHILDREN: THE BOsKET FAMILY AND THE AMERI-
CAN TRADTION OF VIOLENCE (1995); see also MiKAL GILMoRE, SHOT IN THE HEART (1994).
246 See People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930).
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motion of the prosecutor, the trial court should determine whether
the complainant's description of the charged events would sound pa-
tently improbable without contextual explanation.
Once a court has made that determination and finds that the
complainant's narrative requires further explanation, the Accommo-
dation Syndrome is a paradigm that can effectively guide a trial judge
seeking to determine the limits of admissibility of uncharged sexual
acts. 248 The Accommodation Syndrome, at its most basic, illustrates
that early acts of incest can cause a victim to become passive and ac-
commodating, even to escalated levels of abuse.249 The syndrome
thus demonstrates how early events explain and give context to later
events. Therefore, if, in a given case, the uncharged background
demonstrates how the victim's otherwise unexplained passivity devel-
oped, ajudge should find that a contextual basis for admission of the
accompanying acts exists.
2 50
Using the example of the Harris case, it would be appropriate for
the judge to conclude, much as she did in this case, that Anna's pas-
sive acceptance of shocking sexual exploitation, along with her failure
to outcry, require contextual explanation. She could next determine
that Anna's responses were shaped by: (1) her young age at the time
the abuse began; 251 (2) defendant's initial threats to secure her se-
crecy;25 2 (3) his constant access, which permitted him to continue to
abuse her;253 (4) her accommodation, which permitted him to esca-
late the abuse;254 (5) her mother's rebuff of Anna's one attempt at
disclosure;255 and (6) her mother's complete betrayal by becoming an
247 See People v. LeGrand, 431 N.Y.S.2d 850 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
248 For purposes of this article, I assume that the trial judge would be sufficiently knowl-
edgeable about the Accommodation Syndrome to determine the admissibility of un-
charged crimes in limine, without the need for expert testimony. However, the in limine
nature of the determination does afford the trial court the opportunity to take expert
testimony regarding the Accommodation Syndrome, compare the charged and uncharged
crimes and reach a decision, if necessary.
249 See CSAAS supra note 11, at 184-85; see also Abuse of CSAAS, supra note 16, at 154-55.
250 The Accommodation Syndrome has been criticized by some who see it being mis-
used as a diagnostic tool. Summit himself cautioned against prosecutors' use of the syn-
drome in court as proof that a child has been sexually abused, considering it invasive of the
jury's function to determine the truth of the allegations. See Abuse of CSAAS, supra note 16,
at 157-58. However, description of the accommodation pattern does rebut myths which
might prejudice or preclude an understanding of a victim's accommodation, passivity and
delayed or inconsistent disclosure. Id. at 160. In this respect, the Accommodation Syn-
drome is contextually important.
251 See Transcript Record at 8, Harris (No. 3357/86).
252 Id. at 14, 35.
253 Id. at 7, 10, 15.
254 Id. at 16, 17-19.
255 Id. at 14-15.
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abuser as well.2 56 Once a judge reached such a conclusion, the deci-
sion to admit the illustrative acts as necessary context logically follows.
More generally, using this paradigm, a judge can consider
whether the early acts might have shaped the charged crimes. Do
they show how the perpetrator was able to secure his victim's secrecy?
Were there enough of them to engender feelings of helplessness on
the part of the victim? Do the acts demonstrate the child's increasing
passivity? Did the child make any attempts at disclosure that were
rebuffed? If the child subsequent to disclosure recanted, were there
obvious pressures on her to do so? If any of these questions can be
answered in the affirmative, the uncharged acts may be probative.
The courts' willingness to permit experts to testify in a limited
fashion to the existence of Accommodation Syndrome 257 suggests not
only that a growing understanding of the psychological components
of child molestation is making its way into the courtroom, 25 but also
that the syndrome's validity as a tool to develop a true incest narrative
would be well-founded. Under the current practice in most jurisdic-
tions,259 experts are already permitted to testify regarding the syn-
drome much in the way suggested by Summit: not as a diagnosis of
sexual abuse, but to disabuse jurors of myths they might hold as to
how sexually abused children should act.260 The expert may make no
judgments regarding the child's allegations. Such judgments are the
sole province of the jury.2 61
If an expert can already testify about the Accommodation Syn-
drome, is testimony regarding uncharged crimes still necessary? Yes.
First, an expert is much less likely to be called to testify where her
testimony will seem to be at odds with the child complainant. If a
child cannot testify regarding the origin and development of the
256 Id. at 17-18.
257 See People v. Benjamin R., 418 N.Y.S.2d 827, 832 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); see also Peo-
ple v. Ivory, 556 N.Y.S.2d 742, 743 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
258 Earlier judicial interpretation of the statutory sex offenses considered each act of
sexual abuse as a separate and discrete act, without connection. See People v. Keindl, 502
N.E.2d 577, 581-82 (N.Y. 1986); People v. Beauchamp, 532 N.E.2d 111, 114 (N.Y. App. Div.
1988).
259 The overwhelming majority ofjurisdictions will allow testimony based on the Accom-
modation Syndrome when it is used to explain the significance of the child complainant's
seemingly self-impeaching behavior, such as delayed reporting or recantation. SeeAskowitz
& Graham, supra note 18, at 2040 n.57.
260 See People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131, 136 (N.Y. 1990); Ivory, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 743.
261 To permit the expert to give a diagnostic opinion is seen as exceeding the bounds of
jury education and allowing the expert to decide the ultimate issue in the case. See Taylor,
552 N.E.2d at 138-39; see also Russell v. State, 712 S.W.2d 916 (Ark. 1986); Powell v. State,
527 A.2d 276 (Del. Super. Ct. 1987); Allison v. State, 353 S.E.2d 805 (Ga. 1987); State v.
Williams, 858 S.W.2d 796 (Mo. App. 1993); State v. Catsam, 534 A.2d 184 (Vt. 1987); State
v. Hazeltine, 352 N.W.2d 673 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
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charged acts of sexual abuse, her truncated narrative is likely to con-
flict with that of the expert, who must explain the Accommodation
pattern from the beginning. For example, an expert who would tes-
tify as to how accommodation develops over time would appear to be
in conflict with Anna B., who, if restricted to the charged crimes, ap-
pears completely passive from the "beginning." In fact, in such a case,
expert testimony would likely exacerbate doubts regarding the credi-
bility of the adolescent complainant.
Second, the role of the expert is likely to be misunderstood by
jurors, who would expect her to be offering information about the
complainant in the case. This is exactly what the expert cannot do,
since she cannot meet with the child or offer any opinion as to the
allegations. The expert is therefore vulnerable to a defense narrative
that again hurts the complainant: the hired gun who speaks without
knowledge of "the facts."
262
Third, general information regarding the Accommodation Syn-
drome does not provide the specific context for the particular case at
issue. If a narrative is an episodic set of actions and reactions among
actors, an expert can only substitute hypothetical (albeit likely) pos-
sibilities for actual events. Such general testimony would thus seem
more likely to invite speculation than it would to shed light on the
charged acts.
Thus, the better practice would be to let the child victim provide
the factual context for the charged abuse. Admitting the uncharged
crimes for this purpose redresses the wrong done to the child, and
may at the same time preempt the need for an expert to testify at
all.2 63 If the child can provide a clear context for the charged acts, a
judge could well conclude that the jury does not need the assistance
of an expert to determine the facts in issue.2 64
In fact, in cases like LeGrand and Steinberg, the decision to admit
prior uncharged bad acts appears to stem from just this kind ofjudi-
cial approach. In those cases, the courts recognized that the witnesses
262 While little research has been conducted to determine the weightjurors give experts
in cases of child sexual abuse, in the areas of battered woman syndrome and rape trauma
syndrome, research does indicate that jurors are somewhat skeptical of experts. See As-
kowitz & Graham, supra note 18, at 2095-96.
263 The use of expert testimony has been sharply criticized because in some jurisdictions
the Accommodation Syndrome or other "syndromes" are misrepresented as diagnostic of
child sexual abuse in particular cases. See id. at 2044-47, 2048 n.101.
264 Current opinion is divided as to whether or not the public has become knowledgea-
ble enough about child sexual abuse as to render expert testimony unnecessary. Id. at
2093-94. However, if the child is not sufficiently articulate to make the narrative compre-




had traumatizing relationships with their respective defendants, rela-
tionships that prevented the witnesses from being able to react or re-
spond to the violence of the charged offenses. The courts further
recognized that unless the witnesses could testify to the full character
of the past relationships, their testimony regarding the charged of-
fenses would be considered inexplicable and hence incredible. Both
courts, in allowing testimony regarding the defendants' uncharged
crimes, thus linked the explanation of the deviant relationship with
the context exception to Molineux. Traumatized victims of long-term
sexual abuse merit equal treatment.
Indeed, in some jurisdictions the courts have explicitly designated
as probative prior uncharged acts of sexual abuse between defendant
and complainant, where these acts tended, consistent with the Accom-
modation Syndrome, to clarify a complainant's otherwise "inexplica-
ble" behavior.265 In Pounds v. United States, the District of Columbia
court found that prior acts of incest between a defendant and his four-
teen year old daughter were highly probative, in part because it was
important to explain complainant's failure to inform her mother, her
apparent lack of hysteria or trauma when she did disclose and her
matter-of-fact way of describing the charged incidents.266 In admit-
ting the evidence, the court viewed the uncharged crimes as akin to
situations where the evidence is inextricably interwoven with the
charged crimes. 267 In State v. McKay,268 where a defendant was
charged with one incident of sexually abusing his fifteen year old step-
daughter, an Oregon court held that the complainant could testify to
two years of uncharged incidents of sexual abuse.269 The court found
that the uncharged crimes provided necessary context since they
showed that the charged incident did not happen "out of the blue,"
which a jury could find incredible. 270 In State v. G.S., a New Jersey
appellate court found uncharged acts of sexual abuse more probative
than prejudicial, because of their high value in explaining the victim's
failure to outcry.
271
In Alaska and Michigan, the courts have consistently found that
265 See Pounds v. United States, 529 A.2d 791, 795 (D.C. 1987).
266 Id,
267 Id,
268 776 P.2d 1316 (Or. Ct. App, 1989), affd, 787 P.2d 479 (Or. 1990).
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 State v. G.S., 650 A.2d 819, 824 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). For additional cases
where courts have admitted uncharged crimes to give necessary context to the charged
offenses, see People v. Calcagno, 574 N.E.2d 420 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991); People v. Volstad, 287
N.W.2d 660 (Minn. 1980); People v. Diaz, 558 N.E.2d 1363 (Il1. App. Ct. 1990).
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their state rule equivalents of MolineuXQ72 include a context exception
in cases of long-term sexual abuse. In Covington v. State,273 for exam-
ple, the Alaska appellate court found proper the trial court's admis-
sion of three years of early, uncharged incest acts that defendant
committed against his daughter. In recounting the facts of the case,
the court noted that the charged acts began only after complainant
had moved into defendant's bedroom and the two were engaging in
sexual intercourse on a nightly basis.274 The court, relying on Burke v.
State,275 found that the uncharged crimes placed the victim's testi-
mony in context by indicating why she would so readily acquiesce to
the defendant's demands. 276 Similarly, in the Michigan case of People
v. Demarlzex,277 the court found that where uncharged crimes provide
"a link in the chain of testimony," without which the complainant
could be deemed incredible, they should be admitted.278 Since
Demartzex, the Michigan courts have regularly admitted uncharged
crimes in child sexual abuse cases, where they provide context for the
charged offenses.
27 9
Certainly, not all cases of long-term sexual abuse will require con-
textual clarification. In those cases where a complainant does not ex-
hibit severely traumatized responses, or where enough of the pattern
of abuse is evident by way of charged offenses, a court should retain
the discretion to find that uncharged crimes are not sufficiently pro-
bative to warrant admission. 2 0 The Accommodation paradigm is use-
ful in that small subset of the most severe cases, where a child
complainant has been so traumatized by acts of sexual abuse that her
responses and behavior seem incredible without contextual clarifica-
tion. In this class of cases, the paradigm illustrates the link between
past acts and present behavior. The trial judge who wishes to go no
further than to admit those bad acts which explain otherwise un-
272 Both states have adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) into their state evidentiary
codes. See AiAsKA P. EVID. 404(b); MICH. R. EVID. 404(b).
273 703 P.2d 436, 441 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
274 Id. at 438.
275 624 P.2d 1240 (Alaska 1980).
276 Covington v. State, 703 P.2d 436, 441 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2763 (1994).
277 213 N.W.2d 97 (Mich. 1973).
278 Id. at 99 (quoting People v. Jenness, 5 Mich. 305, 323 (1858)).
279 People v. Wright, 411 N.W.2d 826 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); People v. Bailey, 302
N.W.2d 924 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
280 For example, in People v. Hammer, 296 N.W.2d 283 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980), one might
condemn the court's actions as going beyond the scope of placing complainant's testimony
and behavior in context, where the court permitted the introduction of uncharged acts of
abuse committed against the complainant's siblings.
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fathomable behavior would be well-served by the Accommodation
model.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ability of a long-term incest victim to present a credible nar-
rative of her abuse varies widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In
New York, Delaware, and Tennessee the rules of evidence require
that Anna B.'s story be shorn of the contextual background that
makes it comprehensible. 281 In other states, where any act between
victim and defendant is admissible as evidence of defendant's lustful
disposition toward his victim,282 Anna could testify to defendant's
prior abuse. And in Missouri, Indiana or any other jurisdiction that
adopts Federal Rule of Evidence 414, any act of sexual abuse that
Anna's stepfather committed against her or anyone else could conceiva-
bly be used as evidence against him.
2 83
The enactment of the new federal rule increases the possibility
for more widespread review of these differing standards. While such
review would likely center on traditional analyses of what the un-
charged acts say about the defendant in terms of propensities and
prejudice, the opportunity does exist to incorporate the increased in-
sight into victim psychology that the last twenty years of clinical study
has brought.
That the courts do accept and act upon psychological principles
of victimization is evident. The possibility of having a traumatized
child testify over closed-circuit television and the availability of expert
testimony regarding the Accommodation Syndrome are two relatively
recent innovations that courts have sanctioned in appropriate cases.
Both stem from the recognition that in long-term sexual abuse cases,
children adapt to their abusers in order to survive within their fami-
lies. The Accommodation Syndrome details that adaptation explicitly;
closed circuit testimony is an implicit recognition of the power that
the abuser continues to hold over his victim even after the acts them-
selves have ended.
Yet, these innovations are, at best, peripheral in a long-term in-
cest case being tried in a restrictive jurisdiction like New York, since
the courts undermine the credibility of the adolescent victim before
she even begins to testify. The "her versus him" nature of these cases
places paramount importance on the narrative of the teenage com-
281 See supra note 22.
282 See, e.g., State v. Rojas, 868 P.2d 1037 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Tharp v. State, 724
S.W.2d 191 (Ark. 1987); Hicks v. State, 441 So. 2d 1359 (Miss. 1983). See also supra note 23.
283 See supra note 29.
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plainant. Where her narrative is truncated to commence with the un-
believable-her seemingly passive acceptance of horrifying acts of
sexual abuse-the victim faces a burden that may be impossible to
overcome.
Whatever the fate of FRE 413-415, the New York approach is no
longer viable, even under traditional Molineux analysis. Where a com-
plainant's reference to uncharged crimes can make her "inexplicable"
behavior quite understandable, those crimes demonstrate something
quite different from a defendant's propensity; they show the context
within which the charged crimes could be carried out, and they com-
plete the victim's narrative. These are not new "Molineux excep-
tions"-they are commonly accepted, even in New York.
The courts should not ignore what is now quite obvious: The ad-
missibility of uncharged crimes in long-term incest cases should paral-
lel the wide variety of cases where uncharged crimes are routinely
admitted to provide necessary context. Only when the child victim
has this opportunity to tell the jury this "whole truth," can there be
the likelihood of a just outcome.
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